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1 Introduction
Combating anthropogenic climate change is one of the greatest challenges facing humankind.
There are basically two ways of reducing greenhouse-gas (GHG) emissions. On the one hand,
policymakers may apply “command-and-control” policies such as subsidies for “green tech-
nologies” (wind, solar, electric cars, etc.) and administrative measures (e.g. bans on oil heat-
ing, emission performance standards, etc.); on the other hand, market-based policies, such as
putting a price on emissions to internalize their negative externalities. Surprisingly, there is
no econometric study that compares altogether the (cost) effectiveness of the economic first-
best policy, a price on carbon emissions, with the widely applied second-best policies, such as
the subsidization of wind or solar power. However, understanding the effectiveness of climate
policies in terms of abatement and costs is key for deriving optimal (i.e. least cost) solutions
to climate change. This paper fills this gap. We analyze the electricity generation sector – the
sector responsible for the lion’s share of emissions – in the UK and Germany, because these
two countries follow contrasting climate change policies, and show that the market-based in-
strument of carbon pricing is superior to supply-side policies such as subsidization of wind
and solar power.
Many countries have adopted policies to reduce GHG emissions either via international
treaties, such as the Paris Accord, or unilaterally. The bulk of measures are of the “command-
and-control” type. The European Union (EU) declared its intention to reduce GHG emissions
by at least 40% by the year 2030 compared to 1990 and to increase the share of renewable en-
ergy sources (RES) in total energy production to at least 32%. Germany, one of the most active
countries in the deployment of RES, mostly in the form of wind and solar power, promised
in its Climate Action Plan 2050 (“Klimaschutzplan 2050”) to reduce GHG emissions by 55%
by 2030 and by 80%–95% by the year 2050 relative to 1990 (BMUB, 2017). Germany’s share
of renewables should climb to 30% by 2030 and to 60% by 2050 (Monopolkommission, 2017).
Likewise, theUSA – before abandoning the Paris Accord under the Trump administration – fol-
lowed targets to offset emissions significantly under its “Clean Power Plan” (EPA, 2018). Unfor-
tunately, despite all abatement efforts, global emissions have been increasing steadily.1 Even
Germany, the country that has spentmost on renewables per capita worldwide, has seenmore
or less constant emissions in recent years. However, emissions have declined in the UK (c.f.
Figures 2a and 2b). We show in this paper that the introduction of a significant carbon price in
the UK is responsible for this development.
We utilize daily electricity generation data at the plant level on all gas and coal power sta-
tions in Germany and the UK to compare the effectiveness of two sets of environmental poli-
cies. First, we estimate the offsetting effects of RES, in the form of wind and solar power, on
carbon emissions from thermal power plants (i.e. coal and gas plants). Becausewind and solar
1Global emissions rose from 28.13 bn tCO2 in 2005 to 33.44 bn. tCO2 in 2017 (BP, 2018).
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installations are subsidized by the state, we can calculate the costs of using direct subsidies to
abate of one tonne of CO2. Second, both countries are members of the EU Emission Trading
System (ETS) whereby carbon emitting power plants have to buy emission allowances for elec-
tricity production. Thus, polluting power plants internalize the costs of emitting CO2, making
their production relatively more expensive compared to clean technologies. Two effects may
follow. Coal – emitting more CO2 than gas per unit of electricity produced and thus becoming
relatively more expensive than gas with a rising carbon price – may be replaced by gas, ceteris
paribus. Moreover, both gas and coal may be replaced by less carbon-intensive technologies,
such as hydro, nuclear, wind, solar, or imports, which do not need to buy emission allowances.
We estimate the effects of the CO2 price on emissions from gas and coal electricity pro-
duction, allowing us to calculate the costs of abatement of one tonne of CO2 using this in-
strument. Our regression model disentangles the effects of carbon pricing as well as feed-in
fromwind and solar power from other confounding effects, such as changes in demand, input
prices, or seasonality. Moreover, we acknowledge that these effects are interdependent among
each other and dependent on the level of demand. Thus, we allow for highly non-linear rela-
tionships by introducing a set of interactions and higher order terms (up to the cubic terms).
Fortunately, we can evaluate a policy experiment, because the UK introduced a unilateral car-
bon price support (CPS) in addition to the EU ETS price on 1 April 2013. From then on, UK
generators had to pay two components, (i) the EU ETS allowance price plus (ii) the CPS, which
tops up the allowance price and is both significant and increasing over time (see Section 2 for
more details). Thus, we can compare a system solely subject to the EU ETS allowance price
(i.e. Germany) with a system subject to a much higher effective CO2 price (i.e. the UK). This
is important since the EU ETS allowance price has been relatively low and is alleged to be in-
effective in reducing CO2 emissions (see, e.g., Elkerbout and Egenhofer, 2017). In contrast,
we show that a CO2 price is indeed effective in reducing emissions, provided that it reaches a
sufficiently high level.
For Germany, we estimate that the samplemean EU ETS price of arounde8/tCO2 induces
an offset of only 9.6% of total emissions per day, relative to having no carbon price. At such
a low carbon price, we thus do not observe a large reduction in emissions. A carbon price
this low does not result in fuel switching between dirty coal-based and relatively cleaner gas-
based generation. Evaluated at the mean ETS price of e8, we calculate the costs of marginal
abatement for an additional tonne of CO2 emissions to be e52. For the highest observed car-
bon price of in Germany, e15, we estimate significantly higher abatement – 20% of total daily
emissions. The cost effectiveness, in this case, is only e41 per additional tonne of CO2 emis-
sions abated. We also estimate that wind power is, on average, significantly more effective in
abating emissions than solar power. The costs of direct subsidization reveal that, on average,
it costs e204 to replace one additional tonne of CO2 from wind power. For solar power, the
costs are very high, ate979 to replace an additional tonne of CO2, on average.
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Given the unilateral top-up CPS in addition to the EU ETS price, our analysis for the UK is
based on awide range of observed carbon prices – betweene4 ande37. We find thatmarginal
abatement significantly increases as the carbon price rises to e29, followed by lower (but still
positive) marginal abatement at higher carbon prices. Similarly, we find that the cost effec-
tivity of carbon pricing is strongly convex, with a minimum at a carbon price of e36, where
marginal abatement of one tonne of CO2 emissions costs only e30. In contrast, at very low
and very high carbon prices (outside the range we observe), abatement costs are vastly higher.
Although we find (as in Germany) that putting an adequate price on emissions is more cost
effective than subsidizing RES, wind in the UK is more effective than in Germany. Further-
more, over time, falling subsidies for wind result in relatively low costs of replacing an addi-
tional tonne of CO2 by wind. Yet, we argue that with higher levels of wind feed-in as well as
with higher carbon prices, wind’s abatement effectiveness decreases, leading again to higher
marginal costs of abatement.2
Another important result is that the policies of carbon pricing and subsidization of wind
and solar power can be substitutive or complementary, depending on which technology is
replaced bywind or solar at themargin. Themarginal effectiveness of wind and solar increases
with the carbon price in Germany, but decreases in the UK. This is because the relatively low
carbon price in Germany leaves dirty coal to be replaced by wind or solar. In the UK, with its
already high carbon price, it is mainly the relatively clean gas that is replaced, reducing the
effectiveness of RES.
Our results shed light on the optimum size of an effective carbon price. Newbery et al.
(2019) argue that e25–e30/tCO2 would be adequate – which is somewhat in line with our
findings of a high cost-effectiveness of carbon pricing at arounde30–e36/tCO2. The UKGov-
ernment initially set the CPS to increase to £30 (i.e. e35) per tCO2, on top of the EU ETS
price, by 2020 before it froze the CPS at £18.08 (i.e. e20.4) tCO2 (House of Commons, 2016).
CPLC (2017) suggests a global carbon price of $40–$80 (i.e. e35–e70) per tCO2 by 2020 and
$50–$100 per tCO2 (i.e. 44e–e88) by 2030 to meet the Paris climate target. Our results sug-
gest that a carbon price in the e30s already induces significant fuel switching, so that cleaner
gas-fired power plants displace dirty coal. This is evidence that amodest carbon price brings
about a significant reduction in emissions. In contrast, high carbon prices well beyond e40
are associated with lower marginal abatement effects, because most of the coal-fired electric-
ity generation will already have been replaced, leaving only emissions from gas to be offset,
and the associated costs are substantial.3
2Given that the UK’s solar feed-in was essentially zero until 2014, followed by a negligibly low production share
in the subsequent years (see also Appendix Figure B1b), we could not utilize such data in our analysis but can only
speculate that subsidizing solar power is even less cost effective than in Germany.
3Of course, and as we argue later on, short-term replacement of coal by gas can only happen if enough gas-based
electricity generation capacity is already installed. Moreover, here we can only argue for the electricity generation
sector and not for other emitting sectors such as transportation or industry.
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For other countries planning on introducing unilateral carbon prices, our findings are also
relevant, as we show that even relatively modest carbon prices (of around e30/tCO2) may
bring about substantial emissions abatement in the short run - as long as electricity generation
from coal can be replaced by gas. The Netherlands will introduce a carbon tax on electricity
generation at e18/tCO2 in 2020, which should rise to e43 by 2030, and France and Germany
are currently discussing carbon pricing as a means to finally meet their Paris targets (see, e.g.
Gillmann et al., 2018). While a fully cooperative CO2 price worldwide would be the overall first
best, we are far from this optimum (Nordhaus, 2018). In themeantime, this paper is reassuring
for those countries that take unilateral measures such as the UK. These measures work at the
country level at a manageable cost – and indeed at significantly lower costs than in Germany,
where climate policy is based on high subsidies for wind and solar power.4
Our paper extends the growing literature, which estimates the emissions offset from cli-
mate policies. One strand analyzes only second-best climate policies with respect to their
abatement effects viawind and/or solar power (Cullen, 2013; Novan, 2015). Abrell et al. (2019a)
take both the EU ETS price and wind and solar power into account, yet only derive conclu-
sions for renewables, leaving the carbon price to serve merely as a control variable. There
is no study that empirically investigates pricing of CO2 and compares this first-best policy to
other policies, such as direct supply-side subsidization of RES. Fell and Kaffine (2018) compare
the effects of wind generation and natural gas prices on emission reduction while Cullen and
Mansur (2017) liken the effects of natural gas price changes to changes in the carbon price.
Abrell et al. (2019b) also use variation in the price ratio between coal and gas to estimate pre-
dicted emission levels and compare them to actual emission levels when evaluating the UK
CPS. Although itmay be intuitive to expect similar (but opposite) effects fromnatural gas price
changes and carbon price changes, the quantitative effects may differ.5 We thus prefer to di-
rectly include a carbon price compared to indirect methods (e.g. by assuming that the price of
gas mimics the effect of a CO2 price) in order to infer the effectiveness of the respective poli-
cies. Moreover, we extend the literature in many other directions. We employ high-frequency
data at the power plant level, our empirical model is highly non-linear (i.e. up to the cubic
expansion terms and interaction terms), contains a wide range of fixed effects (day of week,
month, year), and includes lagged variables, whereas related papers (e.g. Abrell et al., 2019a;
Cullen, 2013; Cullen and Mansur, 2017; Fell and Kaffine, 2018; Novan, 2015) are not as rich in
4Subsidies for RESmay not have the sole purpose of reducing emissions but also of incentivizing their technologi-
calmaturity. However, a carbonprice also sets incentives for R&Dor technological change towards clean technologies.
5First, natural gas price changes may have different determinants than carbon price changes. Natural gas prices
may respond to general macroeconomic conditions or supply-side technological changes (e.g. “fracking”), while car-
bon prices are (also) determined by political economy factors, e.g. how many allowances are issued. Second, long-
term contracts and/or vertical integration of gas suppliers make it likely that pass-through to marginal costs differ
between natural gas and carbon price changes. Thus, firms may treat a shock to marginal costs that is due to fuel
price changes differently than a comparable shock due to changing carbon prices. Our empirical estimates imply that
the effects of the cost ratio and the carbon price are quantitatively different.
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one or more of these dimensions.
2 Background on carbon pricing and renewables
It is important to assess the effectiveness of climate policies in relation to the power sector be-
cause this sector represents themajor source of global GHG emissions,6 and at a national level
is the main source of emissions in Germany and the UK. The power sectors of both countries
are regulated under the EU ETS, which puts a price on emissions.
It is well established that an optimal carbon price (e.g. in the form of a tax) internalizes the
externality of emissions (Pigou, 1920). Weitzman (1974) demonstrates that, without uncer-
tainty about the marginal benefit and marginal cost curves, both price-based (e.g. emissions
tax) and quantity-based (e.g. cap & trade program) instruments lead to the same level of (opti-
mal) emissions abatement. Thus, carbonpricing represents a first-best solution based onmar-
ket incentives and leads to cost-efficient emissions abatement (Borenstein, 2012). Economists
have long agreed that in practice a direct price on an externality is superior to alternative indi-
rect measures, such as subsidies (see, e.g., Holland et al., 2016). In that respect, Novan (2015,
p. 293) argues that “renewable subsidies present a poor option for reducing pollution” and
that “emission prices will reduce pollution more efficiently than the current renewable poli-
cies (...).”
Against this background, the leading role played by the EU ETS in pricing emissions within
the largest cap-and-trade program in the world is a major step in climate policy. The EU ETS
regulates around 45% of total EUGHG emissions and represents the biggest emissions trading
market in the world (EC, 2016). In the ETS, power plants, but also factories and other emit-
ting firms that are covered, receive or purchase emission allowances, which can be traded.
The emissions cap is set at the EU level and covers carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions, as well
as CO2 equivalents of two other greenhouse gases, nitrous oxide (N2O) and perfluorocarbon
(PFC). During the first phase of the EU ETS from 2005–2007, allowances were abundant result-
ing in an ineffectively low CO2 price. In the second phase, from 2008–2012, allowances were
reduced by 6.5%, but the reduction in economic activity due to the recession resulted again in
an abundance of allowances. During the current phase 2013–2020, the cap on EU allowances
has been reduced by 1.74% each year and “a progressive shift towards auctioning of allowances
in place of cost-free allocation” was introduced (EC, 2016, p. 2). However, for most of the time
during its existence, the EU ETS price has been ineffectively low (see Figure 1), which may be
explained by problems associated with political-economy and behavioral-economy consider-
ations, such as a lack of regulatory commitment (an abundance of allowances may lead to an
insufficiently low CO2 price) ormissing social acceptance of high CO2 prices in the population
6According to the International Energy Association, 42% of global emissions in 2006 were from electricity and
heat generation (IEA, 2019).
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Figure 1: EU ETS price & effective UK CO2 price (e/tCO2)
Effective UK CO2 price = EU ETS price + CPS. 1 April 2013–31 March 2014: CPS = £4.94 (=
e5.84); 1 April 2014–31 March 2015: CPS = £9.55 (= e11.46); 1 April 2015–31 March 2021: CPS
= £18.08 (= e24.63). Sources: EEX (2018) for EU ETS prices (EUA); House of Commons (2016)
for UK CPS rates (converted into Euros according to daily exchange rates from the ECB, 2019).
(see, e.g., Newbery et al., 2019). Moreover, price volatility and expectations of low future car-
bon prices may work against incentives to invest in long-lived, durable, and sunk electricity
generation assets.
The failure of the EU ETS in inducing a low-carbon transition so far has led EU member
states to follow different unilateral (and uncoordinated) climate policies. Germany has been
heavily subsidizing RES (with guaranteed feed-in tariffs as well as subsidies for capacity de-
ployment), mostly in the form of wind and solar power, as a means to reduce emissions from
the power sector. Over the period 2005–2017, Germany’s share of installed wind and solar ca-
pacity rose from 17% to 48%, wind and solar feed-in climbed from 5% to 24% (see also Online
Appendix Figure B1). It plans to provide at least 80% of its gross national electricity supply
from RES by 2050, as stated in the German Renewable Energies Act (“Erneuerbare Energien
Gesetz”, EEG). The costs for the direct subsidization of RES are tremendous, though. The
German Federal Court of Auditors (“Bundesrechnungshof”, BRH, 2018) estimates the costs
directly attributable to the “Energiewende” at (at least)e34 billion in 2017 alone. 7
Parallel to the subsidization of RES, Germany also decided to phase-out nuclear power as
7DICE Consult (2016) estimates the direct costs of the German transition towards decarbonization of the electric-
ity system (“Energiewende”) at e133 Billion between 2000 and 2015 and at e283 Billion for 2000–2025. The German
Government estimates investment costs related to the Energiewende of around e550 Billion between 2017 and 2050
(Bundesregierung, undated). Similarly, Bernecker (2019) mentions costs ofe550–600 Billion.
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Figure 2: Emissions from power sector (MtCO2)
(a) DE
Source: Umweltbundesamt (2018)
(b) UK
Source: BEIS (2018)
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a consequence of the Fukushima-Daiichi nuclear incident in 2011 (Grossi et al., 2017).8 Thus,
a large fraction of RES first has to fill a significant gap in missing electricity production left
by the reduction in low-carbon nuclear power (see also Online Appendix Figure B2). However,
almost a decade on fromGermany’s nuclear phaseout, the effectiveness of RES is still in doubt.
Emissions from the power sector have been by and large constant (with aminor decrease since
2013), as shown in Figure 2a . In September 2018, the German Federal Court of Auditors (BRH,
2018) was highly critical, noting that Germany will clearly fail its goal of significantly reducing
emissions despite enormous financial burdens on its citizens and the economy.
In contrast, the UK follows a different strategy. In April 2013, the British Government in-
troduced a unilateral carbon tax, the CPS, which tops-up the EU ETS allowance price. 9 When
the CPS was introduced, it was due to rise every year from £4.94/tCO2 in 2013 to a price of
£30/tCO2 in 2020. At Budget 2014, the UK Government announced that the CPS would be
capped at £18/tCO2 from 2016 to 2020 to limit the competitive disadvantage faced by busi-
nesses and to reduce energy bills for consumers. This price freeze was extended to 2021 in
Budget 2016 (House of Commons, 2016). Given its magnitude, the CPS represents a signifi-
cant increase in the price of emissions, which we can use for policy analysis. Moreover, as the
top-up tax preserves the price variation (which would vanish during times of a binding price
floor), we can exploit it for econometric regression.
The UK also subsidizes electricity from RES, but the relative magnitude of wind and solar
is less than in Germany. The installed capacity of wind and solar power made up 25% of the
total in 2017 compared to a 48% share in Germany (see Online Appendix Figure B1). However,
Germany’s and the UK’s RES production in 2017 was 16% and 24%, respectively, indicating
that the gap between actual RES feed-in and installed capacity is less pronounced in the UK
as in Germany. This is evidence that the UK has a more favorable environment for wind, since
its solar feed-in is negligibly low.
TheUK strategy seems to pay off in terms of emissions abatement, as can be seen in Figure
2b. Since the introduction of the CPS in 2013, emissions from the power sector have fallen sig-
nificantly, especially during recent years when the effective carbon price in the UK was high.
The share of coal has diminished as gas-fired production has taken the lead. The Figure thus
suggests that putting a significantly high price on carbon emissions induces a fuel switch be-
tween coal- and gas-fired power plants.
To underline our argument, Figure 3 shows the UK’s generation shares of coal and gas by
plant vintage. With an increasing carbon price, we see that the most outdated coal plants
8Grossi et al. (2017) state that the oldest 6 out of 23 nuclear plants (amounting to 6.3MW capacity, producing
around 12% of annual German electricity) were immediately shut off permanently from the system. In subsequent
years, additional nuclear capacity was withdrawn.
9The British Government calls the program a “Carbon Price Floor”, but despite its curious name it does not work
in the fashion of a minimum price (e.g. if the EU ETS price falls below a threshold, the floor price becomes effective)
but it is essentially a top-up tax (CCC, 2014).
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Figure 3: Generation from coal and gas by plant vintage, UK
(a) Coal
Source: own data
(b) Gas
Source: own data
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significantly reduce their output (3a), while the most efficient new gas plants significantly in-
crease their production (B1b). Foremost, Figure 3 shows that with an increasing carbon price,
a large share of coal-fired generation gets replaced by an increasing share of gas-fired electric-
ity. Given that coal emits more than double the amount of CO2 per unit of electricity (MWh)
than gas, these patterns of gas replacing coal at a higher carbon price may explain why the UK
has successfully reduced its emissions from the power sector.
Costs of Climate Policies
We seek to give a first impression (before carrying out our in-depth econometric analysis)
about the directly attributable costs of the various climate policies, as pursued by Germany
and the UK, based on external data.10 We utilize data from CEER reports (CEER, 2013, 2015,
2017, 2018) on the expenditures for wind and solar support schemes in Germany and the UK.
Data on the annual wind (onshore and offshore) and solar feed-in as well as on CO2 emissions
stem from BMWi (2018a) for Germany and from BEIS (2019) for the UK. Using these data, we
can calculate the total expenditures for wind and solar electricity as well as for carbon pricing.
Finally, we divide the total expenditures for each climate policy tool (i.e. wind, solar, carbon
pricing) by the population of each country (as obtained from Eurostat) to arrive at the expen-
ditures per capita of each policy tool.
Table 1 shows that Germany spends large amounts on RES support schemes per capita,
while the expenditures on carbon pricing (within the EU ETS) aremuch lower. Over the period
2010–2017, Germany spent e1,334 per capita on subsidizing wind and solar power, of which
e889went into solar power ande445 intowindpower. Against the relativelymodest reduction
in emissions (see also Figure 2a) over this period, it seems that the costs relative to the outcome
are enormous. Germany’s parallel expenditures on carbon pricing were onlye246 per capita.
For the UK, we can see that the expenditures per capita for RES are modest, at e196, of
which wind received almost the entire sum. The expenditures for carbon pricing, however, are
(by coincidence) equal to those of Germany over the period 2010–2017. This is surprising be-
cause the UK has had considerably higher carbon prices than Germany since 2013. Evidently,
despite the high carbon price in the UK, the drastic reduction in emissions since 2013 (see
also Figure 2b) led to quite favorable expenditures on carbon pricing. Overall, this is evidence
that Germany’s expenditures are huge while its emissions have hardly decreased. On the other
hand, the UK spends much less, while drastically reducing its emissions.
10Appendix Table A2 provides details about how we calculate the expenditures per capita for RES subsidization.
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Table 1: Per capita expenditures for climate policies (e)
Year Pop. Carb. pr. Emissions Expend. Expenditures per capita (e)
(mio.) (e/tCO2) (mio. tCO2) (mio. e) P W+S (W) (S)
Germany
2010 82 14 315 4,521 55 75 (19) (56)
2011 80 13 311 4,110 51 115 (28) (86)
2012 80 7 322 2,398 30 146 (41) (105)
2013 81 4 326 1,450 18 156 (44) (112)
2014 81 6 313 1,852 23 178 (51) (126)
2015 81 8 305 2,346 29 209 (77) (132)
2016 82 5 300 1,605 20 227 (82) (145)
2017 83 6 285 1,641 20 229 (103) (126)
Total 2,477 19,923 246 1334 (445) (889)
UK
2010 63 14 157 2,252 36 9 (9) (0)
2011 63 13 144 1,903 30 15 (15) (0)
2012 63 7 158 1,174 18 20 (20) (0)
2013 64 9 147 1,284 20 28 (28) (0)
2014 64 16 123 2,025 31 25 (25) (0)
2015 65 30 103 3,062 47 38 (35) (3)
2016 65 27 81 2,216 34 27 (26) (2)
2017 66 26 72 1,887 29 35 (32) (2)
Total 984 15,802 246 196 (189) (7)
P, W, & S denote carbon pricing, wind, & solar, respectively. Appendix Tables A1 & A2 provide the underlying
data and details on how we calculate expenditures.
Merit Order effects
We now look at how carbon pricing affects the power supply structure (called the “merit or-
der”) in Germany and the UK. In wholesale power markets wind, solar, hydro, and nuclear
plants are located in the beginning of themerit order due to their lowmarginal costs, followed
by various forms of coal (e.g. lignite, hard coal), whereas natural gas plants are located in the
rather steep part due to their relatively high marginal costs. At its intersection with demand,
under the assumption of perfect competition, the marginal costs of the marginal power plant
determine the wholesale price of electricity. A carbon price essentially increases the marginal
costs of CO2-emitting thermal plants, and the marginal costs of coal plants face a relatively
stronger increase than gas plants because of their higher emission factors. Feed-in from wind
and solar essentially shifts the merit order curve to the right.11
11In contrast to our econometric model, which also takes dynamic processes into account, we abstract from the
following factors in this static analysis of merit order curves: "must run" power plants needed for supply security;
start-up and ramping costs of thermal power plants; heat-coupled power plants.
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Figure 4: Merit order for different carbon prices, DE
(a) Merit order at a carbon price ofe5
(b) Merit order at a carbon price ofe15
The figure depicts sample averages of available net capacities (i.e. installed gross nameplate
capacities corrected for availability factors adjusted to season and average plant outages, e.g.
due to maintenance) in MW by generation technology. Vertical lines indicate demand at the
5th (46,353 MWh), 50th (64,119 MWh), and 95th (81966 MWh) percentiles. Source: own data
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Aswe can see fromFigure 4 for Germany, at a low carbon price (i.e. e5/tCO2; see Figure 4a)
and at average demand (= 64,352MWper hour) coal represents themarginal technology, while
all gas plants are out of the merit order.12 Hence, gas plants serve as peak-load plants, which
only become active during times of higher demand. At subsequently higher carbon prices,
fuel switching between the most effective gas plants and the least effective coal plants begins
to takes place. At a carbon price of e15, some gas plants have replaced the most ineffective
coal plants, so that for some demand levels, now gas represents the marginal technology (see
Figure 4b).
For the UK, the picture is even more pronounced, as shown in Figure 5. For a low carbon
price of e5, which we could observe during the period before the introduction of the CPS on
1 April 2013, essentially all coal plants are located before the gas plants. At mean demand (i.e.
35,544MWper hour), gas represents themarginal technology, which determines thewholesale
price. At a higher carbon price of e15, a large proportion of gas plants switch their positions
with coal plants in the merit order. For this particular case, a significant amount of coal is re-
placed by gas, implying that CO2 emissions decrease significantly. At an even higher price of
e25, gas replaces essentially the entire coal-fired power generation at mean demand. Hence,
a higher carbon price may only be able to bring about additional marginal abatement by re-
placing coal-fired generation in very high demand states (and/or during very lowwind or solar
feed-in).
Given long time-to-build lags, it is evident that the scope for emissions reduction through
short-term fuel switching crucially depends on the available electricity generation capacity of
gas and coal plants. While Germany’s gas capacity is only 40% of its coal capacity, in the UK
gas may fully replace coal. However, there may be substitution among relatively efficient and
inefficient coal plants. That is, a high carbon price may also switch the positions of outdated
coal plants and new efficient ones, contributing to emission reduction.
It is also worth discussing the interaction effects of the carbon price and the influence of
wind and solar power on abatement. In principle, both substitutive (the policies become less
effective) or complementary (the policies become more effective) relations are possible. The
effectiveness ofwind and solar depends onwhich technology (gas or coal) is themarginal tech-
nology in the market in a given hour. In Germany, at a low carbon price (e.g. e5/tCO2), wind
and solar have little effect on abatement because predominantly gas plants get pushed out of
themerit order. At higher carbon prices, the effectiveness of wind and solarmay becomemore
pronounced, as coal also gets replaced. In the UK, on the other hand, gas is more likely to be
the marginal technology to start with, and higher carbon prices may reduce the effectiveness
of wind (and solar).
12The Merit Orders in Figures 4 and 5 depict the sample averages of available net capacities by generation tech-
nology. The installed gross nameplate capacities are corrected for average plant outages (e.g. for maintenance and
availability factors adjusted to season). Solar, wind, and hydro electricity are depicted for their sample average feed-in.
Demand is given for its sample average.
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Figure 5: Merit order for different carbon prices, UK
(a) Merit order at a carbon price ofe5
(b) Merit order at a carbon price ofe15
(c) Merit order at a carbon price ofe25
The figure depicts sample averages of available net capacities (i.e. installed gross nameplate
capacities corrected for availability factors adjusted to season and average plant outages, e.g.
due to maintenance) in MW by generation technology. Vertical lines indicate demand at the
5th (22,980 MWh), 50th (35,887 MWh), and 95th (48,679 MWh) percentiles. Source: own data.
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Analogously, Germany and the UK may import electricity up to their available intercon-
nection capacities from neighboring countries. Power imports happen as long as the sup-
ply structure of a neighbor allows production of cheaper electricity (e.g. nuclear power from
France) until the interconnection capacity is exhausted (or until wholesale prices are equal;
see the discussion in Gugler et al., 2018). In Figures 4 and 5, higher net imports can be inter-
preted as a reduction in national demand (i.e. a shift of demand to the left). Thus, with an
increasing carbon price, the wholesale price of electricity increases, whichmay trigger net im-
ports. Our main results for Germany will show that at initially low carbon prices, a marginal
increase in the carbon price offsets emissions from coal and gas, indicating that both tech-
nologies produce less power, but imports balance the missing supply. Then, at higher carbon
prices, power from gas becomes profitable leading (in parts) to a fuel switch. For the UK, how-
ever, interconnection capacity is limited,such that while at a high carbon price (and especially
during high demand) some power may be imported, most of the missing supply from coal is
filled by electricity from gas.
3 Methodology
We exploit exogenous variations in wind (W ) and solar (S) generation, and in the effective
carbon price (P ) and load (L; i.e. electricity demand) to explain changes in emissions (y) from
thermal electricity plants. Wind and solar electricity feed-in is exogenous, at least in the short
run, as these RES are determined by the weather (e.g. wind speed, solar radiation, air density;
see also Novan, 2015). The carbon price may be considered exogenous in the short run as the
EU ETS price is determined on the exchange for emission permits, which are restricted by the
overall emissions cap for all participating countries and sectors.13 Thus, from the perspective
of an individual power plant operator, the ETS price can be viewed as exogenous. For the
UK, the effective carbon price consists of the EU ETS price plus the CPS, which is determined
by policy. The schedule for introducing and then increasing the CPS was determined long
(years) before any supply or demand realizations of coal or gas power plants. Thus, we also
treat the UK carbon price as exogenous. It is also well established that electricity demand is
exogenous.14
Our model represents a flexible functional form as it allows for highly non-linear relation-
ships through higher-order terms and interactions. We run regressions for four different de-
pendent variables, namely daily CO2 emissions either from coal- or gas-fired plants (actually
our data are at the turbine level) in Germany and the UK. Regarding the exogenous variables,
we include the level and square of P because the impact of the emissions price on emissions
13In a similar analysis, Abrell et al. (2019a) also treat the carbon price as exogenous.
14For example, Blázquez et al. (2013) estimate an inelastic electricity demand for Spain both in the short and long
run.
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may be non-linear. The interactions of P withW , S, and L imply that the effectiveness of the
emissions pricemay also dependupon the levels ofwind, solar, and demand. Thus, we include
W , S, and L in levels, squared, and cubic terms and all of their interactions.
In line with Cullen and Mansur (2017) and Fell and Kaffine (2018), we control for the “cost
ratio”, defined as the coal-to-gas input price ratio (CR = Pcoal /Pgas), to account for the effects
of changes in relative coal-to-natural gas prices. Again,CR is introduced in level, squared, and
cubic terms as well as being interacted with the emissions price. In this way we are able to
isolate the effects of the carbon price from effects of movements in the coal-to-gas input price
ratio. To control for dynamic adjustments of power plants, such as accommodating output to
start-up, ramping and shut-down costs, and also firms’ expectations, we include lagged vari-
ables (see also Cullen, 2013, p.117–118). In particular, Cullen (2013) suggests a transformation
by subtracting the current value of a variable from its lagged values to obtain the impact of
current and lagged information in the coefficient of the contemporaneous variable. This is
to avoid dealing with numerous coefficients of lagged variables. Hence, we include a set of
lag-transformed variables ∆X , where ∆Xt−i = Xt −Xt−i .
We include a vector of cross-sectional fixed effects for each plant turbine (Dp ), to capture
unobserved heterogeneity between power plants, which is constant over time (e.g. location,
vintage). Dt is a set of time fixed effects to capture day-of-week patterns as well as seasonality.
For the UK, the time fixed effects are particularly relevant as they may absorb, for example,
the effect of the EU ‘Large Combustion Plant Directive’ (LCPD, 2001/80/EC), which requires
thermal power plants above 50 MW to limit emissions of sulphur dioxide, nitrogen oxides,
and dust. Plants could either comply with the policy or close after 20,000 hours of remaining
operation (‘opt-out’ option). Since December 2012, nine UK power stations have chosen to
cease production (DEFRA, 2012; National Grid, 2007) due to this constraint. We adapt the set
of time fixed effects to the different sample periods for Germany (shorter period: 1 January
2017–29 June 2018) and the UK (longer period: 27 May 2011–15 July 2018). For the UK, we
apply a set of day-of-week fixed effects as well as quarter-year fixed effects (Fell and Kaffine,
2018). For Germany, we apply day-of-week fixed effects as well as monthly fixed effects.
Thus, our specification isolates from other confounding effects the effects of carbon pric-
ing as well as of wind and solar production on emissions :
yp,c,n,t =
2∑
i=1
βPi P
i
t ,c +βPW Pt ,cWt ,c +βPSPt ,cSt ,c +βPLPt ,cLt ,c +βPCRPt ,cCRt ,c+
3∑
i=1
βWiW
i
t ,c +
3∑
i=1
βSi S
i
t ,c +
3∑
i=1
βLi L
i
t ,c +
3∑
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βCRiCR
i
t ,c+
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The subscripts define each power plant turbine p, located in country c (= DE, UK) using
electricity generation technology n (= coal, gas) at day t of our sample. For the UK, we cannot
apply the data on solar electricity, since feed-in of solar power was essentially zero before the
year 2015, and since then has only made up a negligible share of the UK’s total generation (see
Figure B1b).15 Thus, including data on solar electricity production with long periods of zero
values would render our highly non-linear econometric estimations impossible.16
Since we observe permanent plant exits in the UK, running equation (1) by OLS would not
account for this. Outright exits and zero-production periods would only be captured on the
extensive margin (on/off decision). For this purpose, we follow Fell and Kaffine (2018) and
apply a Heckman two-step model to estimate the full effect of P on emissions, which is com-
posed of the intensive (generation conditional on operating) and extensive margin response.
The two-step model (see, e.g., Greene, 2008, Ch. 24) is as follows. In step one, we estimate the
selection equation via a probit regression, which estimates a plant’s probability of operating
(i.e. producing electricity and thus having positive emissions) or not (zp,c,n,t = 1 if yp,c,n,t >
0 and zp,c,n,t = 0 if yp,c,n,t = 0):
zp,c,n,t =
2∑
i=1
αPi P
i
t ,c +αPW Pt ,cWt ,c +αPSPt ,cSt ,c +αPLPt ,cLt ,c +αPCRPt ,cCRt ,c+
3∑
i=1
αWiW
i
t ,c +
3∑
i=1
αSi S
i
t ,c +
3∑
i=1
αLi L
i
t ,c +
3∑
i=1
αCRiCR
i
t ,c+
3∑
i=1
3∑
j=1
αWiL jW
i
t ,cL
j
t ,c +
3∑
i=1
3∑
j=1
αSiD j S
i
t ,cL
j
t ,c +
3∑
i=1
3∑
j=1
αWiS jW
i
t ,cS
j
t ,c+
5∑
i=1
α∆Wt−i∆Wt−i ,c +
5∑
i=1
α∆St−i∆St−i ,c +δpDp +δtDt+
5∑
i=1
αLt−i∆Lt−i ,c +up,c,n,t . (2)
The exclusion restriction rests on the inclusion of the five day lags of load (
∑5
i=1∆Lt−i ,c ;
see also Fell and Kaffine, 2018) as well as on the different moments of the variables included
in the selection and outcome regressions. From equation (2), we obtain the inverseMill’s ratio
15although rising in the more recent years of the sample, the share of solar feed-in is negligible, with a mean of
0.31% during 2011–2017 (BEIS, 2019).
16For this reason, the empirical model for UK plants reduces to: yp,c,n,t = ∑2i=1βPi Pit ,c + βPW Pt ,cWt ,c +
βPLPt ,cLt ,c + βPCRPt ,cCRt ,c +
∑3
i=1βWiW
i
t ,c +
∑3
i=1βLi L
i
t ,c +
∑3
i=1βCRiCR
i
t ,c +
∑3
i=1
∑3
j=1βWiL jW
i
t ,cL
j
t ,c +∑5
i=1β∆Wt−i∆Wt−i ,c +δpDp +δt Dt +p,c,n,t .
18
(IMR), as λˆp,c,n,t =φ(.)/Φ(.), where φ is the normal pdf andΦ is the cdf.
In step two, we run the outcome equation (1), corrected for selection by adding λˆ, via OLS:
yp,c,n,t =Xp,c,n,tβ+ρλˆp,c,n,t+p,c,n,t . From this, we can predict the full effect of carbon pricing,
which is composed of the intensive and extensive margin impacts (see also Fell and Kaffine,
2018):
E[yp,c,n,t |Xp,c,n,t ,Vp,c,n,t ]=φ(Vp,c,n,tα)[Xp,c,n,tβ+ρλp,c,n,t ]. (3)
The estimated probability of having positive emissions (φ(Vp,c,n,tα)) represents the exten-
sive margin impact, whereas the intensive margin impact is given by [Xp,c,n,tβ+ρλp,c,n,t ].
4 Data
We utilize data on daily electricity production from coal and gas power-plant turbines in Ger-
many and the UK to calculate CO2 emissions at the power-plant turbine level. In our sample,
we observe 85 coal and 53 gas power plants in Germany and 63 coal and 78 gas power plants
in the UK. The electricity generation data stem from the EEX (2018) Transparency Platform
for Germany and from PLATTS PowerVision (2018) (i.e. coal- and gas-fired generation) and
Gridwatch (2018) (i.e. wind and solar generation) for the UK.17 We merge these data by plant
name and turbine number with PLATTS PowerVision (2018)18 to obtain plant characteristics,
such as construction date, turbine type, fuel type, and nameplate capacity. We then calculate
CO2 emissions by applying emission factors and efficiency factors by plant vintage as provided
by the Austrian Transmission SystemOperator, Austrian Power Grid (APG).19 In aggregate, our
calculated emissions properly fit official statistics on CO2 emissions, which is evidence that
our modeling approach is sophisticated.20
Data on the EU ETS carbon price come from the EEX (2018).21 Data on the unilateral car-
bon tax in the UK, which tops up the ETS price, stem from House of Commons (2016). More-
over, we obtain data of hourly wind and solar feed-in as well as demand in Germany, available
for the hourly period 1 January 2017–29 June 2018, from ENTSO-E (2018). For the UK, we
17EEX is the European Energy Exchange for Germany, Austria, and France (trading spot electricity, natural gas,
CO2 emission allowances, and coal). Gridwatch is a platform that provides data about the UK electricity market in
cooperation with Sheffield University. The reason for choosing Gridwatch as the main data source for the UK is that
the data are available for a much longer time period (i.e. since 27 May 2011) than the EEX data.
18PLATTS is a major independent data and information provider for energy and commodity markets. The ‘Pow-
erVision’ database provides information about characteristics of European power plants.
19Umweltbundesamt (2018) publishes emissions and efficiency factors for Germany’s thermal power plants.
20A comparison of our sample data of yearly aggregated UK emissions (as derived from the electricity generation
data) with official statistics from BEIS (2018) give an average consistency of 99% for the years 2012–2017 (for which
we observe the full yearly period in our data). Our sample data of German emissions accord with official statistics
fromUmweltbundesamt (2018) to 85% for the year 2017 (for which we observe the full yearly period in our data). The
difference occurs because the EEX data in our sample only cover power plants equal or greater than 100MW (so small
plants are not covered).
21The EEX Transparency Platform provides information about Central European wholesale energy markets.
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Table 2: Summary statistics
(a) Germany
Variable Mean StD. Min p25 p50 p75 Max
Coal-based emissions (tCO2) 6,334 5,765 0 1,265 4,952 10,313 21,187
Gas-based emissions (tCO2) 661 1,015 0 0 8 1,154 6,594
Carbon price (e) 7.82 3.44 4.26 5.07 6.96 9.53 16.35
Wind (GWh) 306 201 33 139 256 418 967
Solar(GWh) 108 69 5 43 105 166 248
Load (GWh) 1,544 182 666 1,429 1,573 1,682 1,881
Cost ratio (Pcoal/Pgas) 0.51 0.06 0.18 0.46 0.52 0.55 0.62
(b) United Kingdom
Variable Mean StD. Min p25 p50 p75 Max
Coal-based emissions (tCO2) 3,355 4,979 0 0 0 8,011 15,343
Gas-based emissions (tCO2) 1,143 1,514 0 0 0 2,181 9,168
Carbon price (e) 19.71 9.75 3.15 10.18 19.07 27.78 37.04
Wind (GWh) 59 43 1 26 49 84 244
Load (GWh) 814 121 69 726 813 895 1,195
Cost ratio (Pcoal/Pgas) 0.41 0.12 0.12 0.31 0.38 0.50 0.94
Notes: All values are for the daily frequency. Coal- and gas-based emissions are per power plant; other variables are
for the power sector. DE: sample period is January 1, 2017–June 29, 2018. UK: sample period is May 27, 2011–July
15, 2018.
obtain data on wind feed-in and demand from Gridwatch (2018) for the much longer hourly
period 27 May 2011–15 July 2018. This is important, because we observe low carbon prices in
the UK before the introduction of the top-up tax on 1 April 2013, and the subsequent increases
of the unilateral tax in 2014 and 2015. We aggregate the hourly data to the daily frequency to
match the other data. We also collected data on the daily spot prices of coal and gas, as pro-
vided by PLATTS PowerVision (2018), allowing us to create a measure of the relative fuel costs,
as in Cullen andMansur (2017) and Fell and Kaffine (2018).
Table 2 provides summary statistics for Germany and the UK. We can see that the German
electricitymarket, with an average daily load of 1,544GWh, is about twice the size of the British
market, which has an average load of 814 GWh. On average, a German power plant emits
6,995 tCO2 each day, which can be almost entirely attributed to coal-based emissions (6,334
tCO2) with a minor fraction to gas (661 tCO2). In the UK, average emissions per coal plant
(3,355 tCO2) and per gas plant (1,143 tCO2) are not as unbalanced as in Germany. Moreover,
the share of wind in Germany (19.8%= 306/1,544) is much more pronounced than in the UK
(7%= 59/814). The carbon price in Germany is determined by the EU ETS, with a daily mean
of e7.82, whereas the effective UK carbon price, composed of the EU ETS price plus the CPS,
lies at amuch higher mean ofe19.71. The standard deviations of all variables are high relative
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to their means, pointing to sufficient variation for econometric regression.
5 Results
This section presents our empirical results on the effectiveness of emissions abatement from
carbon pricing and from wind and solar power. We first discuss our results for Germany. In
contrast to the UK, Germany has not intervened unilaterally against the low EU ETS carbon
price, but rather relies on vast subsidies for wind and solar power. Next, we provide evidence
for the UK, which has less wind and solar power in place but a significantly higher effective
carbon price due to its unilateral top-up tax on the EU ETS price. Finally, we put our results
into perspective and evaluate the climate policies in Germany and the UK in terms of directly
attributable costs.
5.1 CO2 abatement: Germany
Carbon pricing
In Table 3, we predict the daily emissions of all German coal and gas power plants for various
carbon price levels (evaluated at mean values for other control variables).22 Moreover, Table 3
gives themarginal abatement effect at each carbon price, which is calculated as the additional
CO2 abatement if the price increased by one Euro. All estimates are based on the Heckman
regression estimates of equations (1) and (2), as provided in Table B3 in the Online Appendix.
To do this, we use the estimates from the Heckman two-step estimator (eq. 3) incorporating
both the intensive (i.e. generation conditional on operating) and extensive (on/off decision)
margin responses.23 We present the estimates for Germany within a relatively narrow range
of observed carbon prices between e4 and e16 (as well as out-of-sample predictions for low
carbon prices betweene0 ande4) during the sample period January 1, 2017–June 29, 2018.
At a low carbon price of e1/tCO2, we predict 586,621 tCO2. Predicted emissions drop by
21% once we reach a carbon price of e16 (i.e. 461,289 tCO2). The total marginal abatement
increases modestly from 8,162 tCO2 at a carbon price of e4/tCO2 to 8,766 tCO2 at e9/tCO2
and then modestly declines again to 8,258 at e15/tCO2. However, the marginal abatement
effects on coal differ from those on gas-based emissions. At successively higher carbon prices,
coal-fired emissions decline significantly, resulting in higher marginal abatement effects. At a
low price of e4, a marginal increase in the carbon price by e1 (to e5) abates 6,525 tCO2 per
day from coal-fired electricity generation (of all German coal-fired power plants). At a price
22That is, we predict the average daily emissions per power plant (eq. 3) and thenmultiply this value by the number
of power plants.
23Tables A3 and A4 in the Appendix present the estimated probabilities of producing electricity with coal or gas-
fired power plants for various levels of the carbon price as well as for different wind, and solar feed-in levels.
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Table 3: Effects of carbon pricing, DE
Carbon price
(e/tCO2)
Predicted emissions (tCO2) Marginal abatement (tCO2)
Coal Gas Total Coal Gas Total
Out of sample
1 552,701 33,920 586,621 5,033 2,208 7,241
2 547,668 31,712 579,380 5,581 2,018 7,599
3 542,087 29,694 571,782 6,078 1,827 7,905
In sample
4 536,009 27,868 563,876 6,525 1,636 8,162
5 529,484 26,231 555,715 6,921 1,449 8,370
6 522,563 24,782 547,345 7,266 1,267 8,533
7 515,297 23,514 538,811 7,561 1,091 8,652
8 507,736 22,424 530,159 7,809 920 8,729
9 499,927 21,503 521,430 8,010 756 8,766
10 491,917 20,748 512,664 8,168 597 8,764
11 483,749 20,151 503,900 8,285 442 8,727
12 475,465 19,708 495,173 8,364 292 8,655
13 467,101 19,417 486,518 8,408 144 8,552
14 458,693 19,273 477,966 8,421 -3 8,419
15 450,271 19,276 469,547 8,407 -149 8,258
16 441,864 19,425 461,289
All estimates are evaluated at means for other control variables. Predicted emissions and marginal
abatement effects are calculated as a composite of all German coal or gas power plants per day. The
mean (median) carbon price ise7.82 (e6.96). All estimates are significant at the 5% level.
of e15, a marginal increase (to e16) brings about a reduction of 8,407 tCO2 per day due to
reduced coal-fired electricity generation.
Naturally, the marginal abatement effects of the carbon price on emissions from gas-fired
electricity generation are much smaller, since gas plants produce less electricity than coal
plants, and eachMWh of electricity produced from gas plants contains less CO2 (less than half
compared to old coal plants) than from coal. Moreover, marginal abatement declines with ris-
ing carbon prices. At a low carbon price of e4, 1,636 tCO2 per day are abated at the margin.
But at a carbon price ofe14marginal abatement turns negative, meaning that predicted emis-
sions from gas increase. This is the turning point for fuel switching in Germany. For carbon
prices of e14 or higher, the most ineffective coal plants are replaced by the most effective gas
plants, which thus produce more emissions at the margin.
Taking the results of coal and gas together, we observe fairly constant marginal abatement
(see Table 3) over the observed range of carbon prices in Germany. During our sample period,
themean ETS price is only arounde8, whichmarginally offsets on average 8,729 tCO2 per day
(evaluated for the average carbon price ofe8 and formeans of other control variables). That is,
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the installation of the EU ETS reduces, on average, merely 9.6% of the daily emissions relative
to having no carbon price in place (i.e. relative to predicted emissions of 586,621 tCO2 at a
carbon price ofe1/tCO2) in Germany, implying that the carbon offset has beenmodest so far.
In contrast, an ETS price as high as e15 replaces already 21% of average predicted emissions
in Germany relative to no CO2 price in place. In practice, it seems that the relatively modest
carbon prices observed in Germany have only had limited effectiveness in terms of abating
CO2 emissions.
The limited effectiveness of the carbon price in Germany can be explained by the logic
of electricity markets. At a low ETS price, the additional costs of emitting CO2 are not large
enough to displace large amounts of coal in themerit order, as witnessed by Figure 4a. Only at
higher carbon prices (frome14 on), would more andmore electricity generation from coal be
replaced by gas, which significantly increases the effectiveness of the CO2 price.
One may wonder which sources of electricity would re-establish demand-supply parity
at each instant in Germany, if both coal- and gas-fired generation were eventually reduced
by an increase in the carbon price (as observed for carbon prices up to e14; see Table 3). A
regression of German net imports (i.e. imports minus exports) reveals that net imports (e.g.
from France, which has a high share of nuclear electricity; or Austria, which has a high share
of run-of-river generation) increase by approximately the same amount as coal- and gas-fired
generation decrease with a higher carbon price, thereby substituting for the missing load in
Germany. Only for carbon prices abovee14 does fuel switching unfold, i.e. more andmore gas
replaces coal, which would be the most effective short-term climate policy available.24 This
implies that Germany’s effectiveness in terms of replacing emissions through carbon pricing
depends heavily on imports (whereas the UK is relatively shut off from electricity imports; see
also Online Appendix Tables B5 and B6). These imports, however, may also contain emissions,
which are not taken into account, thus putting the effectiveness of carbon pricing in Germany
(i.e. 21% emissions reduction at a price ofe16) into perspective.
Wind and solar
Table 4 shows the marginal abatement effects of wind and solar power in Germany (evaluated
at means for other control variables). Both marginal abatement curves imply that for higher
levels of wind and solar feed-in, marginal abatement tends to modestly decline followed by
an increase. Evaluated for the mean level of wind feed-in of around 300 GWh, a marginal in-
crease of wind by one GWh replaces 386 tCO2 per day, which can be almost entirely attributed
to abatement of emissions from coal. Indeed, Figure 4a shows that for a low carbon price (as
we observe most of the time in Germany) and for average demand, wind essentially offsets
coal emissions, making it highly effective. By taking the integral over the marginal abatement
24Short-term fuel switching is, of course, only possible in countries with enough installed capacity of gas-fired
power plants.
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Table 4: Marginal abatement effects of wind & solar, DE
Wind
(GWh)
Mrg. abatement (tCO2) Solar
(GWh)
Mrg. abatement (tCO2)
Coal Gas Total Coal Gas Total
50 413 69 482 10 317 -1 316
100 383 64 447 30 254 30 283
150 361 59 420 50 206 56 262
200 346 55 401 70 175 78 252
250 339 51 390 90 160 95 255
300 339 47 386 110 163 108 270
350 346 45 391 130 182 116 298
400 360 42 403 150 217 119 336
450 382 40 422 170 268 118 385
500 410 39 449 190 334 111 445
550 445 38 483 210 414 100 514
600 486 38 524 230 509 83 592
650 534 38 572 250 620 61 681
700 587 39 626
Marginal effects are evaluated at means for other control variables. All estimates are signif-
icant at the 5% level. The mean (median) values of wind and solar are 305.78 GWh (255.74
GWh) and 108.18 GWh (104.68 GWh), respectively. Predicted emissions for zero wind and so-
lar feed-in are 689,607 tCO2 and 589,707 per day, respectively.
Table 5: Marginal abatement effects of wind & solar for different carbon prices, DE
Carbon
price (e)
Wind: mrg. abatem. (tCO2) Carbon
price (e)
Solar: mrg. abatement (tCO2)
Coal Gas Total Coal Gas Total
4 318 53 370 4 124 115 239
5 325 51 376 5 137 111 248
6 333 49 382 6 151 106 257
7 340 47 387 7 164 101 265
8 348 45 393 8 177 97 274
9 356 43 398 9 190 92 282
10 363 41 404 10 203 87 290
11 370 39 409 11 215 83 298
12 378 37 415 12 228 78 306
13 385 35 420 13 240 73 313
14 393 33 425 14 252 69 321
15 400 31 431 15 264 64 329
Marginal effects are evaluated at means for other control variables. All estimates are significant at the 5% level.
The mean (median) value of the carbon price is 7.82e/tCO2 (6.96e/tCO2).
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function up to the sample mean value of wind,25 we estimate that, on average, wind in Ger-
many abates 126,340 tCO2 per day. Evaluated against predicted emissions of 689,607 tCO2
during zero wind feed-in (and evaluated at means for other control variables), wind in Ger-
many replaces an average of 18% of daily emissions.
Solar marginally replaces 270 tCO2 per day at its sample mean of around 110 GWh, which
is significantly less than wind. However, its marginal abatement tends to increase with higher
feed-in. That is, evaluated at the relatively low sample mean of the ETS price (i.e. e7.82/tCO2)
and average demand, solar can increasingly replace mainly coal, so that it can unfold its full
abatement potential. Taking the integral over themarginal abatement function up to the sam-
ple mean of solar production of 110 GWh, 29,607 tCO2 are offset each day, on average. Again,
evaluated against predicted emissions of 589,707 tCO2 during zero solar feed-in (and evalu-
ated at means for other control variables), solar in Germany only replaces an average of 6% of
daily emissions.
Moreover, we can show that for relatively low carbon prices as observed in Germany (i.e.
e4–e16/tCO2), wind and solar power complement the EU ETS. Table 5 shows that wind and
solar become more effective with higher carbon prices. This is the case because rising carbon
prices imply that wind and solar replace more andmore coal. However, once the carbon price
is high enough to induce extensive fuel switching, such that most coal-based emissions get
replaced, wind and solar may only be able to further offset emissions from gas. This would
severely limit their effectiveness (as it already seems to be the case in theUK; see Section 5.2).26
So far, we have shown that the effectiveness of the limited range of carbon prices observed
in Germany has only been modestly successful in abating CO2 emissions because the price
was not high enough to induce vast fuel switching. For the German supply structure, having
relatively modern coal plants and rather inefficient gas plants, fuel switching starts at around
e14/tCO2. Hence, we would need carbon prices well above e14 to benefit from a significant
short-term reduction in emissions due to large-scale replacement of coal with gas.27 More-
over, we show that as long as vast amounts of coal and gas have not switched positions in the
merit order, wind and solar as policy tools are complementary to the EU ETS. Finally, evalu-
ated for average conditions, wind outperforms solar power, making it the more effective tool
for climate policy in Germany. However, our results are not yet indicative about the cost effec-
tiveness of each individual climate policy, which we will investigate in Section 5.3. Before we
do so, we present our main results for the UK, which follows a climate strategy of high carbon
25We approximate the integral over themarginal abatement function up to an average feed-in of 300 GWhwind as
50 · (482+447+420+401+390+386)= 126,340 tCO2.
26In the Online Appendix, we also evaluate the effectiveness of wind and solar against load and find that while
wind’s effectiveness stays nearly constant, solar’s effectiveness strongly vanishes with higher load.
27As predicted by ourmodel, this seems to be happening at the time of writing (July, 2019), when the EU ETS price
reached around e25. In the first half of 2019, German CO2 emissions from electricity production decreased by 15%,
because of coal-gas switching (see FAZ, 4 July 2019, “Stromerzeugung verursacht deutlichweniger CO2”, www.faz.net/
aktuell/wirtschaft/stromerzeugung-verursacht-deutlich-weniger-co2-16268214.html, access 10 July 2019).
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prices instead of a vast subsidization of wind and solar power.
5.2 CO2 abatement: UK
Carbon pricing
Asmentioned above, the UK has experienced amuch larger effective carbon price from 1 April
2013 onward, since it introduced the unilateral top-up tax (the CPS) in addition to the EU ETS
price. This policy measure allows us to estimate the effects of the carbon price over a much
wider price range than for Germany. During the sample period 27 May 2011–15 July 2018, we
observe carbon prices betweene4 ande37.
Again, we use our Heckman estimates of equations (1) and (2) (see Appendix Table B4 for
the regression output) and derive the full effect (eq. 3) of the carbon price, including the
intensive and extensive margin responses. While we found fairly constant marginal abate-
ment within the range of observed carbon prices of e4–e16 in Germany, Table 6 shows that
in the UK marginal abatement is a concave function, which significantly increases from low
to medium carbon prices until it reaches a maximum at e29/tCO2. The daily predicted emis-
sions from all UK coal and gas power plants fall from 273,197tCO2 at a price of e1 to 189,703
tCO2 at a carbon price the hight of e38 during the very recent sample period (i.e. a difference
of 83,494 tCO2 per day) – a reduction by 31% attributable to the carbon price. From Table 6
we also observe that vast amounts of coal-based emissions are replaced at medium to high
carbon prices. That is, predicted emissions from coal are cut approximately in half due to the
observed high carbon price of nearly e38/tCO2. From this perspective, the emissions price
instrument has contributed significantly to reducing coal-based emissions in the UK.
Our estimates also show that at a carbon price of e14/tCO2, fuel switching sets in. This is
indicated by negative marginal abatement from gas, meaning that more and more electricity
is produced from gas power plants, substituting for the loss of coal-fired electricity. Thus, in
line with Germany, the replacement of the most ineffective coal plants by the most efficient
gas plants starts at a carbon price of arounde14. With even higher carbon prices well beyond
e38/tCO2, the marginal offset of coal-based emissions would start declining, as fewer and
fewer coal plants stay in the merit order to be pushed out. This is why total marginal abate-
ment (as the sum of marginal abatements of coal- and gas-based emissions) finally tapers off
for high carbon prices.
Our estimates include both the intensive and the extensivemargin responses. A few words
are in order about the relative magnitudes of these two kinds of effects, because a substantial
fraction of coal-powered plants permanently exited the UK electricity market. 28 During our
sample period (27 May 2011–15 July 2018), 33 power plant units with a total capacity of 14,250
28For Germany, although we do observe periods of inaction for some power plants, we do not observe the perma-
nent exit of any coal plants during our observation period.
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Table 6: Effects of carbon pricing, UK
Carbon price
(e/tCO2)
Predicted emissions (tCO2) Marginal abatement (tCO2)
Coal Gas Total Coal Gas Total
Out of sample
1 213,400 59,797 273,197 -1,116 1,197 81
2 214,516 58,600 273,116 -854 1,091 237
3 215,369 57,509 272,879 -591 986 395
In sample
4 215,960 56,523 272,483 -329 884 555
5 216,289 55,639 271,928 -68 783 715
6 216,357 54,856 271,213 192 684 876
7 216,166 54,172 270,337 449 587 1,036
8 215,716 53,585 269,301 705 490 1,195
9 215,011 53,095 268,106 958 395 1,353
10 214,053 52,700 266,753 1,208 301 1,509
11 212,846 52,399 265,244 1,454 207 1,661
12 211,392 52,191 263,583 1,697 114 1,811
13 209,695 52,077 261,772 1,935 21 1,956
14 207,760 52,056 259,816 2,168 -71 2,097
15 205,592 52,127 257,719 2,396 -164 2,232
16 203,196 52,291 255,487 2,618 -256 2,362
17 200,578 52,547 253,125 2,835 -349 2,485
18 197,743 52,897 250,640 3,044 -443 2,601
19 194,699 53,340 248,039 3,246 -537 2,709
20 191,453 53,877 245,329 3,441 -632 2,810
21 188,011 54,508 242,520 3,628 -727 2,901
22 184,383 55,236 239,619 3,807 -824 2,983
23 180,576 56,059 236,636 3,976 -921 3,055
24 176,600 56,981 233,581 4,136 -1,019 3,117
25 172,464 58,000 230,464 4,287 -1,119 3,168
26 168,177 59,119 227,296 4,427 -1,219 3,208
27 163,751 60,338 224,088 4,556 -1,321 3,236
28 159,194 61,658 220,853 4,675 -1,423 3,252
29 154,520 63,081 217,601 4,782 -1,526 3,256
30 149,738 64,607 214,345 4,877 -1,630 3,247
31 144,861 66,238 211,098 4,960 -1,735 3,225
32 139,900 67,973 207,873 5,031 -1,841 3,191
33 134,869 69,813 204,682 5,090 -1,946 3,143
34 129,779 71,760 201,539 5,135 -2,053 3,083
35 124,644 73,812 198,456 5,167 -2,159 3,009
36 119,477 75,971 195,448 5,187 -2,265 2,922
37 114,290 78,236 192,526 5,193 -2,370 2,823
38 109,097 80,606 189,703
All estimates are evaluated at means for other control variables. Predicted emissions and marginal
abatement effects are calculated as a composite of allUK coal or gas power plants per day. Themean
(median) carbon price ise19.71 (e19.07). All estimates are significant at the 5% level.
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Figure 6: UK coal plants: operating state and capacity utilization
Operating state refers to the percentage of coal plants being active (i.e. producing electric-
ity 1/0). Capacity utilization gives the share of electricity produced relative to total available
capacity for those coal plants that are active.
MW left the market permanently, while only 30 coal plants with a total capacity of 13,885 MW
remained active (c.f. Online Appendix Tables B1 and B2). Moreover, spells of inactive periods
of coal plants increased significantly during times of high CO2 prices following the introduc-
tion of the unilateral top-up tax. Figure 6 shows that the percentage of coal plants producing
electricity on a given day (dashed black line) decreases with an increasing carbon price (solid
black line) over time. What is more, the capacity utilization rate of those coal plants, which
are active (i.e. producing electricity; dashed blue line), also diminishes with an increasing car-
bon price over time. This implies that not only do fewer coal plants stay online in the market
but that those which stay produce significantly less electricity.29 In addition, Figure 6 indi-
cates that with a high carbon price since the last price jump on 1 April 2015, active coal plants’
production (dashed blue line) becomes more volatile, most likely because coal and gas plants
have switched their positions, such that coal has taken the peak-load function and gas serves
as base-load (i.e. less volatile production).
Appendix Table A5 presents the probit estimates of the selection equation (eq. 2; i.e. the
first stage of the Heckman procedure) indicating the probability of coal and gas plants pro-
ducing electricity (and thus emitting CO2) for each observed carbon price. We see that the
probability of producing electricity from coal declines significantly from 39% at a carbon price
29Since this implies a sub-optimal utilization rate, given start-up and ramping costs, additional costs are incurred.
We do not try to quantify these.
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of e5 to 15% at a price of e37. Hence, the full abatement effect of the carbon price related to
coal-fired electricity generation is driven to a substantial degree by the extensive margin re-
sponse. Conversely, for gas plants, the probability of being active increases substantially from
35% at a low carbon price of e5 to 56% at a price of e37, indicating that gas substitutes for
electricity production from coal both on the intensive as well as extensive margin.
To sum up, the supply structure in the UK, with relatively efficient gas plants and relatively
inefficient coal plants, allows for vast fuel switching at medium to high carbon prices. We find
that large-scale displacement of coal by gas in the merit order results in a drastic decrease of
emissions starting at a carbon price of around e14. At successively higher CO2 price levels,
coal-fired generation is increasingly pushed out of the merit order while more gas comes in.
The effectiveness of the carbon price at reducing emissions begins to taper off at a price of
e29, although it remains substantial over the whole range of observed prices. Both coal and
gas respond in both dimensions, the intensive and extensive margins, although in opposite
directions. Thus, the carbon price itself helped encourage a large number of coal power plants
to exit the market for good in the UK.
Wind
The UK has significantly less feed-in of wind power than Germany (both in relative and ab-
solute terms). Table 7 gives the marginal abatement effects of wind for different feed-in lev-
els in the UK, evaluated at means for other control variables. Importantly, we evaluate the
marginal effectiveness of wind conditional on the sample average carbon price of e19.71, at
which many coal and gas plants have already switched their positions. Thus, we can see that
wind replaces not only emissions from coal but also from gas. The marginal abatement curve
is concave with amaximum effectiveness of 992 tCO2 at wind feed-in level of 100 GWh. This is
in stark contrast to Germany, where wind feed-in of 100 GWh brings about amarginal replace-
ment of only 447 tCO2. The higher effectiveness of UK’S wind in terms of emissions reduction
than in Germany is most likely because for a higher average carbon price, wind can (at least
partly) push coal out of the merit order, whereas in Germany it is mainly gas that is replaced
for a relatively low average carbon price. At the sample mean of around 60 GWh (actually
59.32 GWh) of wind feed-in, wind marginally replaces 962 tCO2 (i.e. 655 tCO2 from coal and
307 tCO2 from gas) per day. Wind’s total abatement in the UK, calculated as the integral up
to 60 GWh of wind,30 is about 54,000 tCO2. This means that the sample average wind feed-in
in the UK replaces 17% of total predicted emissions without wind (i.e. 313,494 tCO2 per day
evaluated for zero wind feed-in and at the means of other control variables).
Table 8 shows the marginal performance of wind power, evaluated at its sample average
feed-in, abating emissions for the range of observed carbon prices. The higher the carbon
30We approximate the integral over the marginal abatement function of wind as 10 · (823+860+892+920+943+
962)= 54,001 tCO2.
29
Table 7: Marginal abatement effects of wind, UK
Wind
(GWh)
Marginal abatement (tCO2)
Coal Gas Total
10 584 239 823
20 603 257 860
30 620 272 892
40 634 286 920
50 646 297 943
60 655 307 962
70 661 315 976
80 665 321 986
90 666 325 991
100 665 327 992
110 661 327 988
120 654 325 979
130 645 321 966
140 633 316 949
150 619 309 928
Marginal effects are evaluated at means for other
control variables. The mean (median) value of
wind is 59.32 GWh (49.25 GWh). All estimates are
significant at the 5% level. Predicted emissions for
zero wind feed-in are 313,494 tCO2 per day.
price, the lower themarginal reduction of coal-powered emissions and the larger themarginal
reduction of gas-powered emissions. A higher carbon price moves coal more and more out of
themerit order leaving less to be replaced bywind, and at the same timemovesmore andmore
gas into the merit order to be replaced by wind. Thus, with fewer coal-based emissions to be
offset by wind with higher carbon prices, wind offsets progressively more gas at higher carbon
prices. In total, the lower potential for offsetting coal reduces the total marginal abatement of
wind with increasing carbon prices. We can conclude that for high carbon prices (e.g. e36),
the effectiveness of wind reduces by around half compared to its effectiveness at low carbon
prices (e.g. e4) because the potential for replacing coal-based emissions vanishes. Moreover,
Figure C2 in the online appendix indicates that the effectiveness of wind in the UK tapers off
at high electricity demand, because during peak load wind offsets gas rather than coal at the
margin.
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Table 8: Marginal abatement effects of wind for different carbon prices, UK
Carbon
price (e)
Wind: marginal abatement (tCO2)
Coal Gas Total
4 898 255 1153
6 855 261 1116
8 812 267 1079
10 769 274 1042
12 726 280 1006
14 683 287 969
16 640 293 933
18 597 300 896
20 554 306 860
22 511 313 823
24 467 319 787
26 424 326 750
28 381 332 713
30 338 338 676
32 295 344 639
34 251 350 601
36 208 356 564
Marginal effects are evaluated at means for other con-
trol variables. The mean (median) carbon price is e19.71
(e19.07). All estimates are significant at the 5% level.
5.3 Cost effectiveness of climate policies
As laid out above, the empirical results so far have only addressed the effectiveness of carbon
pricing and feed-in of wind and solar power in terms of abating CO2 emissions. Cullen (2013)
points out when valuing offset emissions one needs to consider the regulatory status of the
pollutant and its marginal damage costs. Offset emissions do not imply a reduction in total
emissions if emissions are regulated under a binding cap-and-trade program such as the EU
ETS (i.e. the “water-bed effect”). That is, if one country introduces a unilateral abatement pol-
icy (e.g. a top-up-tax to the EU ETS price as in the UK or vast subsidies for RES as in Germany),
abated emissions lead to an abundance of emissions permits, which will be used for emis-
sions somewhere else. Moreover, marginal damage costs would have to be estimated, which
is beyond the scope of this paper (see, e.g. Tol, 2005, for a review of this literature). For these
reasons, we confine our analysis to the question of the directly attributable costs of the various
policies.31
31We only account for the direct payments of generators (DE: payments for EU ETS allowances; UK: payments for
EU ETS allowances plus tax payments due to the CPS). We do not account for increased total production costs due
to fuel switching (i.e. a rising carbon price leading to an increase in more expensive natural gas and a decrease in
cheaper coal generation) or other electricity substitution (such as imports).
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That is, we try to answer the question: what have been the costs of each tonne of CO2
abatement using a carbon price or subsidies for wind or solar power? Moreover, it should be
kept in mind that we estimate the costs of CO2 abatement policies only in the respective areas
of the policy, Germany and the UK. We do not account for the externalities of these policies,
such as pollution permits being freed up for use elsewhere in the EU ETS system, nor for pos-
sible leakage or import/export effects.32
Germany
We measure the costs of marginal abatement from carbon pricing in Germany based on our
estimates, as presented in Table 3, as follows.33 We utilize the total predicted emissions at-
tributable to each carbon price to calculate the associated costs simply as the carbon price
multiplied by the respective emissions. This further allows for calculating the marginal costs
related to each carbon price as the change in costs by an incremental increase in the carbon
price (e.g. from e4 to e5). We finally divide the marginal costs by the marginal abatement for
each carbon price to arrive at the costs of marginal abatement of one tCO2.
Table 9 presents the costs of marginally abating one tonne of CO2 for each carbon price
observed inGermany. The results presented above suggest that within the limited range of ETS
prices, predicted emissions from our model decrease only moderately (from 586,621 tCO2 at
e1 to 461,289 tCO2 at e16) and the respective marginal abatement effects are fairly constant
within this range of prices. This yields slightly declining costs of marginal abatement with
higher carbon prices. At the sample mean carbon price of around e8, the associated costs of
marginal abatement aree52, and for a price as high ase15, it costse41 to abate an additional
tonne of CO2.
Let us compare the cost effectiveness of carbon pricing with subsidies for wind and solar
power in Germany. We estimated that an average GWh of wind production offsets 386 tCO2
per day (see Table 4; this accords to 0.386 tCO2 perMWh). In 2017, subsidies per MWh feed-in
of onshore and offshore wind are e64.71 and e159.07, respectively (CEER, 2018). The feed-in
ratio of onshore to offshorewind is 84.4% to 15.6%. We thus calculate the average costs of abat-
ing one tCO2 fromwind ate204 (= (e64.71 ·0.844+e159.07 ·0.156)/0.386 tCO2). From Table 4
we can see thatmarginal abatement tends to increase with higher levels of wind (evaluated for
32The possible externalities are varied and complex. E.g., an increased carbon price leads to a reduction of permits
used in the UK electricity sector but relieves permits in other industries in the UK and/or in other countries of the
ETS, offsetting the initial effect via reduced carbon prices. More wind and solar generation also reduces demand for
permits reducing the carbon price leading to less CO2 abatement elsewhere. Carbon leakage (i.e. the relocation of
production sites to countries not covered by the ETS) may not be a big problem in the electricity sector, whereas trade
may partially offset the initial effects. For example, the UK carbon tax may lead to a higher wholesale electricity price,
attracting electricity imports to the UK (although interconnector capacity limits the scope for trade). The effects on
CO2 emissions depend on the CO2 content of these imports. Likewise, more wind in Germany may lead to more
exports leading to CO2 offsets also in other countries.
33Since it may be difficult to follow the description of how wemeasure the marginal costs of abatement, Appendix
Table 9 provides more details.
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Table 9: Cost effectiveness of carbon pricing, DE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Carbon
price (e)
Predicted emis-
sions (tCO2)
Marg. aba-
tement (tCO2)
Emissions
costs (e)
Marginal
costs (e)
Costs of marg.
abatem. (e/tCO2)
[see Table 3] [see Table 3] [(1)·(2)] [change in (4)] [(5)/(3)]
Out of sample
1 586,621 7,241 586,621 572,140 79.02
2 579,380 7,599 1,158,761 556,584 73.25
3 571,782 7,905 1,715,345 540,161 68.33
In sample
4 563,876 8,162 2,255,506 523,069 64.09
5 555,715 8,370 2,778,575 505,493 60.39
6 547,345 8,533 3,284,068 487,612 57.14
7 538,811 8,652 3,771,680 469,594 54.27
8 530,159 8,729 4,241,275 451,597 51.73
9 521,430 8,766 4,692,872 433,771 49.48
10 512,664 8,764 5,126,643 416,255 47.49
11 503,900 8,727 5,542,899 399,177 45.74
12 495,173 8,655 5,942,076 382,655 44.21
13 486,518 8,552 6,324,731 366,794 42.89
14 477,966 8,419 6,691,524 351,687 41.78
15 469,547 8,258 7,043,211 337,415 40.86
16 461,289 7,380,626
the mean carbon price of e7.82/tCO2 and other control variables). This leads to the conclu-
sion that the cost effectiveness of wind also tends to increase with higher shares of wind. At a
high level of wind feed-in of 700 GWh (again, evaluated for the mean carbon price), marginal
abatement is around 626 tCO2, which yields an average cost of e126/tCO2. We thus conclude
that while with higher levels of wind in Germany, the average cost effectiveness of wind im-
proves, the cost effectiveness of wind remains well below the cost effectiveness of the carbon
price.
The average marginal offset of one GWh of solar is estimated at 270 tCO2 (see Table 4; this
accords to 0.270 tCO2 perMWh). Given average subsidies for solar power ofe264.41 perMWh,
we calculate the average costs of abating one tCO2 from solar power ate979 (=e264.41/0.270).
Again, themarginal effectiveness of solar power tends to increase between the sample average
of 110 GWh (270 tCO2 per day) up to high solar feed-in levels of 250 GWh of 681 tCO2 per day.
At this high level of solar feed-in, the associated costs of marginal abatement significantly fall
toe388/tCO2. However, 250 GWh of solar feed-in reflects themaximumobserved in Germany
during our sample period, and its associated costs are still significantly higher than those of
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wind and even more so than those of the carbon price. We can thus conclude that carbon
pricing in Germany is significantly more cost effective than the subsidization of wind power
and extremely cost effective compared to solar power.
Our cost analysis seems plausible given the findings by Abrell et al. (2019a), who estimate
that the costs for abating one tCO2 through solar power range between e500 and e1,200 in
Germany. Regarding wind, the authors estimate costs of e110–e340/tCO2. Our estimates
on the average cost effectiveness of both wind (i.e. 204 e/tCO2) and solar power (i.e. 979
e/tCO2) are within these intervals. Also, in line with other scholars (Abrell et al., 2019a; Novan,
2015), we find that the higher subsidies for solar power do not seem to be justified, as wind
abates more CO2 per MWh than solar, evaluated at the sample mean. Novan (2015) estimates
that wind outperforms solar in terms of abatement and also concludes that higher subsidies
for solar are not justified. Also, although not part of his empirical analysis, he argues that
climate policies should be targeted at emissions offset, proposing emissions taxes or tight cap-
and-trade programs. We are the first to deliver a comprehensive empirical analysis of carbon
pricing as well as RES subsidization to draw a direct comparison of the cost effectiveness of
these policies and find corroborative evidence for Novan (2015)’s recommendation.
UK
For the UK, we observe a wider range of carbon prices compared to Germany, up to a price
of e37. The predicted emissions from our model, which can be attributed to the respective
carbon prices, are given in Table 10.34 The emissions fall as the carbon price increases, and the
resulting marginal abatement function is concave with a maximum at a carbon price of e29.
Moreover, from the total costs of emissions, measured as the carbon price times emissions, we
get a resulting marginal costs function, which decreases over the range of UK sample prices
(as already provided in Table 6) until a carbon price of e36 is reached. Eventually, this gives
us a strongly falling function of marginal abatement costs with costs of abatement reaching a
minimum of e29.9/tCO2 at a relatively high carbon price of e36. For carbon prices beyond
e36 the costs of marginal abatement increase again (which holds true for the out-of-sample
prediction of the costs of marginal abatement).
The relatively low costs of marginal abatement at medium to high carbon prices are good
news for effective climate policy-making. With higher carbon prices, more coal gets pushed
out of themarket, an the gas that generally fills the production gap contains less CO2 emissions
per unit of electricity produced. Eventually, for very high carbon prices beyond e36/tCO2,
there seems to be little scope left for replacing further coal-based emissions, which results in
increasing costs of marginally offsetting emissions. At the sample mean of the carbon price of
34Due to the highly non-linearmodel, its cornersmay be imprecisely estimated. Thus, the costs ofmarginal abate-
ment of very low carbon prices may be overstated, and should thus be viewed with caution.
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Table 10: Cost effectiveness of carbon pricing, UK
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Carbon
price (e)
Predicted emis-
sions (tCO2)
Marg. aba-
tement (tCO2)
Emissions
costs (e)
Marginal
costs (e)
Costs of marg.
abatem. (e/tCO2)
[see Table 6] [see Table 6] [(1)·(2)] [change in (4)] [(5)/(3)]
Out of sample
1 273,197 81 273,197 273,035 3,369.50
2 273,116 237 546,232 272,404 1,148.41
3 272,879 395 818,636 271,297 686.24
In Sample
4 272,483 555 1,089,933 269,709 486.09
5 271,928 715 1,359,642 267,637 374.21
6 271,213 876 1,627,280 265,083 302.67
7 270,337 1,036 1,892,362 262,049 252.93
8 269,301 1,195 2,154,411 258,543 216.30
9 268,106 1,353 2,412,955 254,575 188.15
10 266,753 1,509 2,667,530 250,158 165.82
11 265,244 1,661 2,917,688 245,308 147.65
12 263,583 1,811 3,162,996 240,043 132.56
13 261,772 1,956 3,403,039 234,386 119.82
14 259,816 2,097 3,637,425 228,363 108.91
15 257,719 2,232 3,865,789 222,002 99.45
16 255,487 2,362 4,087,791 215,334 91.17
17 253,125 2,485 4,303,125 208,395 83.86
18 250,640 2,601 4,511,520 201,220 77.36
19 248,039 2,709 4,712,739 193,850 71.55
20 245,329 2,810 4,906,589 186,328 66.32
21 242,520 2,901 5,092,917 178,699 61.60
22 239,619 2,983 5,271,616 171,011 57.33
23 236,636 3,055 5,442,627 163,313 53.46
24 233,581 3,117 5,605,940 155,658 49.94
25 230,464 3,168 5,761,598 148,098 46.75
26 227,296 3,208 5,909,696 140,690 43.86
27 224,088 3,236 6,050,386 133,487 41.25
28 220,853 3,252 6,183,873 126,549 38.92
29 217,601 3,256 6,310,421 119,931 36.84
30 214,345 3,247 6,430,353 113,692 35.02
31 211,098 3,225 6,544,045 107,889 33.45
32 207,873 3,191 6,651,934 102,578 32.15
33 204,682 3,143 6,754,512 97,814 31.12
34 201,539 3,083 6,852,326 93,651 30.38
35 198,456 3,009 6,945,977 90,140 29.96
36 195,448 2,922 7,036,117 87,331 29.89
37 192,526 2,823 7,123,448 85,269 30.21
38 189,703 7,208,717
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around e20, the costs of marginal abatement are estimated at e66/tCO2. For 2018, the mean
carbon price lies ate35, for which the costs of marginal abatement are 30e/tCO2.
Again, we can compare these findings with the cost effectiveness of wind power. An av-
erage GWh of wind power in the UK replaces 962 tCO2 per day (see Table 7; this accords to
0.962 tCO2 perMWh). In 2017, the average subsidies per MWh of onshore and offshore wind
were equal, ate51.76 (CEER, 2018). Thus, the average costs of abating one tCO2 through wind
power are e53.81 (=e51.76/0.962 tCO2). This is in stark contrast to Germany, were the aver-
age effectiveness of wind is much lower (i.e. 386 tCO2 per GWh of wind) and subsidies are on
average higher.
In the UK, the effectiveness of wind – given the overall low wind feed-in – increases with
higher feed-in levels (as discussed in Section 5.2), whereas the average UK subsidies for wind
decreased significantly over the years leading up to 2017.35 However, given the already high
carbon price, wind and carbon pricing are substitutive policies in the UK (as discussed in Sec-
tion 5.2). Thus, a further deployment of wind in the future and the high carbon price (leaving
only gas to be replaced) will reduce its effectiveness. Thus, for example, in 2018 at an average
carbon price of e35, the cost effectiveness of wind was e72.3/tCO2. We conclude therefore
that while wind is more effective in the UK than in Germany, the effectiveness of the carbon
price remains unmatched.
6 Conclusion
We compare the (cost) effectiveness of the economic first best policy, a price on carbon emis-
sions, with widely applied second-best policies, such as the subsidization of wind or solar, by
analyzing the electricity generation sectors in Germany and the UK. We explain why Germany
has failed and the UK has succeeded in reducing GHG emissions. These two countries follow
significantly different carbon abatement policies. While Germany relies excessively on direct
subsidization of wind and solar energy, the UK introduced a unilateral carbon price support
(CPS) in addition to the EU ETS price on 1 April 2013, gradually increasing the carbon price to
more thane30/tCO2 for UK generators.
We utilize daily electricity generation data at the plant level on all gas and coal power sta-
tions in Germany and the UK to compare the effectiveness of these two sets of environmental
policies. First, we estimate the effects of the carbon price on emissions from thermal power
plants (i.e. coal and gas plants). Second, we estimate the offsetting effects of RES, in the form
of wind and solar power, on carbon emissions. Finally, we calculate under reasonable assump-
tions the marginal abatement costs of these sets of policies.
35In 2016, subsidies perMWh of onshore and offshore wind weree54,50 each (CEER, 2018). In 2015, subsidies per
MWhweree72.26 for onshore ande61.53 for offshore wind (CEER, 2017). Weighted by their capacity shares of 62.2%
and 37.8%, respectively, the average subsidy per MWh of wind feed-in wase61.95.
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Ourmain finding is that putting a carbon price on emissions is the most cost effective way
of reducing emissions. In Germany, at a carbon price ofe15, the marginal abatement costs of
one tonne of CO2 are e41. This policy already offsets 21% of daily emissions; a higher carbon
price (e.g. as witnessed in theUK) would be evenmore effective. This compares favorably with
themarginal abatement costs of wind of arounde204, and evenmore so with those of solar of
around e979. This is due to the fact that, on average, solar power in Germany is less efficient
(i.e. it reduces less CO2 per unit of electricity output) but receivesmuch higher subsidies com-
pared to wind power. The high carbon price in the UK (brought about by the CPF) results in
substantial abatement of more than 30% of total emissions, and approximately half of emis-
sions from coal. Costs of marginal abatement fall over the range of UK sample prices, which
gives a minimum of e29.9/tCO2 at a carbon price of e36. While wind is more effective than
in Germany (at a cost ofe72.3/tCO2 in 2018), the cost effectiveness of carbon pricing remains
unmatched. Secondly, we find that policies can be substitutive or complementary, depending
on which technology is replaced by wind or solar at the margin. The marginal effectiveness of
wind and solar increases with the carbon price in Germany, but decreases in the UK. This is
because – starting from a low carbon price – increasing carbon prices in Germany puts more
and more coal at the margin to be replaced by wind or solar. In the UK – having a high carbon
price – coal is already largely replaced by gas and given further increases in the carbon prices,
wind pushes more andmore gas out of the merit order, reducing its effectiveness.
What does our study add to the climate change discussion? First, as expected from an eco-
nomics standpoint, putting a price on emissions is shown to be the least costly way to reduce
emissions. Economists have always favoredmarket based instruments on theoretical grounds
– it is good to know that they are also right empirically. Thus, the reassuring message from
our study is that national policies – in view of the difficulties of full multilateral cooperation –
can work. Effective climate policy doesn’t have to be expensive. Second, however, the (short
run) effectiveness of environmental policies in general depends on easily available substitutes.
In the electricity sector, with long time-to-build lags, the effectiveness of policies depend on
pre-existing capacities. If countries are endowed with an abundance of relatively efficient gas
fired power plants, such as the UK, putting a high price on carbon is a very effective policy,
since coal can be replaced in a relatively short-termmanner at reasonable costs. This dramat-
ically reduces GHG emissions. If countries partly lack this endowment, as Germany, short-run
replacements are more difficult to attain. Finally, let us mention one caveat: this study anal-
yses short-run fuel switching. It does not analyze longer run effects of the policies such as
investment-incentive effects in low carbon generation capacity, nor effects on R&D to induce
technological change. Ultimately, these effects will be the decisive ones for whether or not hu-
mankind succeeds in curbing global warming. However, just as it does in the short term, we
have no reason to doubt that a proper carbon price also provides better longer term incentives
than other climate policies do.
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Appendix
A Additional Tables and Figures
Table A1: Expenditures for carbon pricing
Country Year Populationa Carbon priceb Emissionsc Expend. Expend. per capita (e)
(mio.) (e/tCO2) (mio. tCO2) (mio. e) Carbon price
DE 2010 82 14 315 4,521 55
DE 2011 80 13 311 4,110 51
DE 2012 80 7 322 2,398 30
DE 2013 81 4 326 1,450 18
DE 2014 81 6 313 1,852 23
DE 2015 81 8 305 2,346 29
DE 2016 82 5 300 1,605 20
DE 2017 83 6 285 1,641 20
UK 2010 63 14 157 2,252 36
UK 2011 63 13 144 1,903 30
UK 2012 63 7 158 1,174 18
UK 2013 64 9 147 1,284 20
UK 2014 64 16 123 2,025 31
UK 2015 65 30 103 3,062 47
UK 2016 65 27 81 2,216 34
UK 2017 66 26 72 1,887 29
a Source: Eurostat
b Sources: EEX (2018) for the EU ETS price; House of Commons (2016) for the UK CPS
c Sources: Umweltbundesamt (2018) for DE; BEIS (2018) for UK
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Table A2: Expenditures for RES
Country Year Populationa Avg. support (e/MWh)b Generation (TWh)c Expend. (mio. e) Expend. per capita (e)
(mio.) Windd Solar Wind Solar Wind Solar Wind Solar Wind & Solar
DE 2010 82 41 388 39 12 1,584 4,550 19 56 75
DE 2011 80 45 354 50 20 2,266 6,935 28 86 115
DE 2012 80 63 320 52 26 3,259 8,440 41 105 146
DE 2013 81 67 292 53 31 3,526 9,038 44 112 156
DE 2014 81 71 283 58 36 4,152 10,212 51 126 178
DE 2015 81 78 277 80 39 6,237 10,712 77 132 209
DE 2016 82 84 314 80 38 6,718 11,949 82 145 227
DE 2017 83 81 264 106 39 8,513 10,418 103 126 229
UK 2010 63 70 200 7.97 0 555 0 9 0 9
UK 2011 63 73 290 12.91 0 939 0 15 0 15
UK 2012 63 73 292 17.16 0 1,249 0 20 0 20
UK 2013 64 74 257 23.96 0 1,782 0 28 0 28
UK 2014 64 60 232 26.76 0 1,597 0 25 0 25
UK 2015 65 68 155 33.26 1 2,247 218 35 3 38
UK 2016 65 55 55 30.71 2 1,674 111 26 2 27
UK 2017 66 52 52 40.95 3 2,120 154 32 2 35
a Source: Eurostat
b Source: CEER (2013, 2015, 2017, 2018)
c Source: BMWi (2018a) for DE, BEIS (2019) for UK
d Average support for wind weighted by feed-in of onshore and offshore wind (not shown for sake of brevity).
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Table A3: Predicted probabilities of producing conditional on the carbon price, DE
Carbon price (e) Coal plants Gas plants
5 91.1% 49.9%
6 90.2% 46.8%
7 89.2% 44.2%
8 88.3% 41.9%
9 87.3% 39.9%
10 86.3% 38.4%
11 85.3% 37.2%
12 84.3% 36.3%
13 83.3% 35.8%
14 82.4% 35.7%
15 81.5% 35.8%
16 80.6% 36.3%
This Table gives the the probability of producing electricity
from coal- or gas-fired power plants based on probit esti-
mates of eq. 2 for Germany.
Table A4: Probability of producing conditional on wind & solar feed-in, DE
Wind (GWh) Coal Gas Solar (GWh) Coal Gas
50 93.8% 59.6% 10 89.3% 44.9%
100 93.2% 54.8% 30 89.9% 45.4%
150 92.3% 50.8% 50 90.0% 45.3%
200 91.3% 47.4% 70 89.7% 44.7%
250 90.1% 44.6% 90 89.2% 43.6%
300 88.5% 42.3% 110 88.3% 42.0%
350 86.8% 40.4% 130 87.3% 40.0%
400 84.7% 38.9% 150 86.3% 37.7%
450 82.5% 37.5% 170 85.2% 35.0%
500 80.1% 36.3% 190 84.2% 32.0%
550 77.5% 35.0% 210 83.5% 28.8%
600 74.9% 33.7% 230 83.1% 25.5%
650 72.2% 32.2% 250 83.4% 22.1%
700 69.8% 30.5%
This Table gives the the probability of producing electricity from coal- or gas-fired
power plants based on probit estimates of eq. 2 for the UK.
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Table A5: Probability of producing conditional on the carbon price, UK
Carbon price (e) Coal plants Gas plants
5 38.5% 34.8%
7 37.5% 34.7%
9 36.5% 34.7%
11 35.3% 34.9%
13 34.1% 35.3%
15 32.8% 35.9%
17 31.4% 36.7%
19 29.9% 37.7%
21 28.4% 38.9%
23 26.8% 40.3%
25 25.2% 41.9%
27 23.6% 43.7%
29 21.9% 45.7%
31 20.3% 47.9%
33 18.6% 50.4%
35 17.0% 53.0%
37 15.3% 55.9%
This Table gives the the probability of producing electricity
from coal- or gas-fired power plants based on probit esti-
mates of eq. 2 for the UK.
Table A6: Probability of producing conditional on wind feed-in, UK
Wind (GWh) Coal plants Gas plants
5 29.8% 42.8%
15 29.6% 42.5%
25 29.5% 41.9%
35 29.4% 41.0%
45 29.3% 40.0%
55 29.3% 38.7%
65 29.4% 37.3%
75 29.5% 35.7%
85 29.7% 34.0%
95 29.9% 32.2%
105 30.1% 30.4%
115 30.4% 28.6%
125 30.8% 26.8%
135 31.1% 25.0%
145 31.5% 23.3%
This Table gives the the probability of producing elec-
tricity from coal- or gas-fired power plants based on
probit estimates of eq. 2 for the UK.
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1
B Additional Tables and Figures
Figure B1: generation and capacity shares of wind and solar power (%)
(a) DE
Source: BMWi (2018a,b)
(b) UK
Source: BEIS (2019)
2
Figure B2: Generation by technology, DE
Sources: Umweltbundesamt (2018)
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Table B1: Inactive coal power plant units, UK
Plant name Unit # Capacity (MW) Inactive since
Kingsnorth ST 4 485 2017 Jun *
Drax ST 1R 645 2017 Apr *
Ferrybridge C ST 1 490 2017 Mar *
Ferrybridge C ST 2 490 2017 Mar *
Ferrybridge C ST 3 490 2017 Mar *
Ferrybridge C ST 4 490 2017 Mar *
Rugeley B ST 6R 488 2017 Mar
Rugeley B ST 7R 496 2017 Mar
Kingsnorth ST 3 485 2016 Jun *
Didcot A 4 485 2016 Apr *
Longannet ST 1 574 2016 Apr
Longannet ST 2 485 2016 Apr
Longannet ST 3 574 2016 Apr
Longannet ST 4 574 2016 Apr
Kingsnorth ST 2 574 2015 Jun *
Cockenzie 1 260 2015 Jun *
Didcot A 3 500 2015 Apr *
Cockenzie 2 265 2015 Mar *
Cockenzie 3 270 2015 Mar *
Cockenzie 4 265 2015 Mar *
Kingsnorth ST 1 485 2014 Jun *
Didcot A 2 485 2014 Apr *
Drax ST 3R 645 2014 May *
Uskmouth 1 Fifoots Point 13 115 2014 Mar
Uskmouth 1 Fifoots Point 14 115 2014 Mar
Uskmouth 1 Fifoots Point 15 115 2014 Mar
Didcot A 1 485 2013 Apr *
Drax ST 2R 645 2013 Mar *
Ironbridge 1 R 470 2013 Mar *
Ironbridge 2 R 420 2013 Feb *
Tilbury Rwe Npower ST 8R 320 2012 Dec *
Tilbury Rwe Npower ST 9R 285 2012 Dec *
Tilbury Rwe Npower ST 10R 280 2012 Dec *
Total 33 units 14,250
*Unit officially exited (either decommissioned or continues its operations as a biomass unit).
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Table B2: Active coal power plant units, UK
Plant name Unit # Capacity (MW)
Aberthaw B 8 524
Aberthaw B 7 524
Aberthaw B 9 535
Cottam 3 500
Cottam 2 500
Cottam 4 497
Cottam 1 497
Drax ST 5 645
Drax ST 4R 645
Drax ST 6 645
Eggborough 2 R 480
Eggborough 1 R 490
Eggborough 3 R 495
Eggborough 4 R 495
Fiddlers Ferry 1 485
Fiddlers Ferry 2 485
Fiddlers Ferry 4 506
Fiddlers Ferry 3 485
Lynemouth 1R 133
Lynemouth 2R 132
Lynemouth 3R 132
Ratcliffe-On-Soar 4 505
Ratcliffe-On-Soar 3 500
Ratcliffe-On-Soar 1 500
Ratcliffe-On-Soar 2 502
West Burton A 3 492
West Burton A 2 492
West Burton A 4 484
West Burton A 1 480
Wilton Power ST1-3 100
Total 30 units 13,885
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Table B3: Regression Output, DE
Coal Gas
P -333.5093 ** W*D3 0.0000 P -14.7979 W*D3 -0.0000
(150.4788) (0.0000) (66.6543) (0.0000)
P2 -2.7181 W2*D3 0.0000 P2 0.6406 W2*D3 0.0000
(2.7902) (0.0000) (1.2814) (0.0000)
CR 28,866.8418 ** W3*D3 -0.0000 * CR -7,789.1016 W3*D3 -0.0000
(12,820.8633) (0.0000) (5,609.7422) (0.0000)
CR2 -83,927.9219 *** S*D -0.0000 CR2 17,314.0293 S*D -0.0000 **
(32,548.7656) (0.0000) (13,969.6953) (0.0000)
CR3 67,101.0547 *** S2*D 0.0000 CR3 -13,512.4619 S2*D 0.0000 **
(26,039.0625) (0.0000) (11,108.8906) (0.0000)
W 0.1228 S3*D -0.0000 W 0.1258 S3*D -0.0000 *
(0.3477) (0.0000) (0.1681) (0.0000)
W2 -0.0000 S*D2 0.0000 W2 -0.0000 S*D2 0.0000 **
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
W3 0.0000 ** S2*D2 -0.0000 W3 0.0000 S2*D2 -0.0000 **
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
S 0.8574 S3*D2 0.0000 S 1.5516 ** S3*D2 0.0000 *
(1.1417) (0.0000) (0.6517) (0.0000)
S2 -0.0000 S*D3 -0.0000 S2 -0.0000 ** S*D3 -0.0000 **
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
S3 0.0000 S2*D3 0.0000 S3 0.0000 * S2*D3 0.0000 **
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
D -0.0082 S3*D3 -0.0000 D 0.1157 ** S3*D3 -0.0000 *
(0.0948) (0.0000) (0.0553) (0.0000)
D2 0.0000 ∆Wt-1 0.0001 D
2 -0.0000 ** ∆Wt-1 0.0000
(0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000)
D3 -0.0000 ∆Wt-2 -0.0000 D
3 0.0000 ** ∆Wt-2 -0.0000
(0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000)
P*CR 502.8192 ** ∆Wt-3 0.0001 P*CR 99.6816 ∆Wt-3 0.0000
(245.2283) (0.0001) (107.7481) (0.0000)
P*W -0.0001 *** ∆Wt-4 0.0001 P*W 0.0000 ** ∆Wt-4 -0.0001
(0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000)
P*S -0.0002 ∆Wt-5 -0.0001 P*S 0.0001 * ∆Wt-5 -0.0000
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000)
P*D 0.0001 *** ∆St-1 -0.0012 ** P*D -0.0000 *** ∆St-1 -0.0001
(0.0000) (0.0005) (0.0000) (0.0002)
W*D -0.0000 ∆St-1 0.0020 *** W*D -0.0000 ∆St-1 -0.0001
(0.0000) (0.0005) (0.0000) (0.0002)
W2*D 0.0000 ∆St-3 -0.0004 W
2*D 0.0000 ∆St-3 0.0000
(0.0000) (0.0005) (0.0000) (0.0002)
W3*D -0.0000 ** ∆St-4 0.0006 W
3*D -0.0000 ∆St-4 0.0002
(0.0000) (0.0005) (0.0000) (0.0002)
W*D2 -0.0000 ∆St-5 -0.0006 W*D
2 0.0000 ∆St-1 -0.0006 ***
(0.0000) (0.0005) (0.0000) (0.0002)
W2*D2 -0.0000 λˆ -1,805.4100 *** W2*D2 -0.0000 λˆ -776.5982 ***
(0.0000) (138.5527) (0.0000) (37.2059)
W3*D2 0.0000 * W3*D2 0.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000)
Obs. 36,563 Obs. 14,068
R2 0.825 R2 0.675
The regressions include day-of-week and monthly fixed effects. Sample period: 1 January 2017–29 June 2018. Standard errors in
parentheses. ***, **, * signify statistical significance at the 99%, 95%, and 90% level, respectively.
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Table B4: Regression Output UK
Coal Gas
P 187.6537 *** W2*D -0.0000 P -41.4135 *** W2*D -0.0000
(42.1971) (0.0000) (13.8410) (0.0000)
P2 -2.8082 *** W3*D 0.0000 P2 0.3474 W3*D 0.0000
(0.9222) (0.0000) (0.2401) (0.0000)
CR 31,421.1699 *** W*D2 -0.0000 CR 2,281.5691 * W*D2 -0.0000 **
(4,240.0029) (0.0000) (1,186.7061) (0.0000)
CR2 -80,818.4688 *** W2*D2 0.0000 CR2 1,271.9083 W2*D2 0.0000
(8,586.7959) (0.0000) (2,215.5269) (0.0000)
CR3 56,498.6719 *** W3*D2 -0.0000 CR3 -1,947.9681 W3*D2 -0.0000
(5,604.3262) (0.0000) (1,331.4818) (0.0000)
W -0.1160 W*D3 0.0000 W -0.1003 * W*D3 0.0000 **
(0.1713) (0.0000) (0.0572) (0.0000)
W2 0.0000 W2*D3 -0.0000 W2 0.0000 W2*D3 -0.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
W3 -0.0000 W3*D3 0.0000 W3 -0.0000 W3*D3 0.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
D 0.0218 *** ∆Wt-1 -0.0014 *** D 0.0052 *** ∆Wt-1 -0.0009 ***
(0.0052) (0.0005) (0.0020) (0.0001)
D2 -0.0000 ∆Wt-2 0.0008 * D
2 -0.0000 ** ∆Wt-2 -0.0000
(0.0000) (0.0005) (0.0000) (0.0001)
D3 0.0000 ∆Wt-3 -0.0006 D
3 0.0000 ** ∆Wt-3 -0.0000
(0.0000) (0.0005) (0.0000) (0.0001)
P*CR -179.9605 *** ∆Wt-4 -0.0002 P*CR -48.3920 *** ∆Wt-4 -0.0001
(44.7036) (0.0005) (12.6871) (0.0001)
P*W 0.0003 *** ∆Wt-5 -0.0009 ** P*W -0.0001 *** ∆Wt-5 0.0001
(0.0000) (0.0004) (0.0000) (0.0001)
P*D -0.0001 *** λˆ -270.7316 ** P*D 0.0001 *** λˆ -789.2795 ***
(0.0000) (108.5102) (0.0000) (47.7451)
W*D 0.0000 W*D 0.0000 *
(0.0000) (0.0000)
Obs. 59,980 Obs. 97,208
R2 0.633 R2 0.595
The regressions include day-of-week and quarter-year fixed effects. Sample period: 27 May 2011–15 July 2018. Standard errors
in parentheses. ***, **, * signify statistical significance at the 99%, 95%, and 90% level, respectively.
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Table B5: Marginal effects of trade flows for different carbon prices, DE
Carbon price Import Export Net imports
(e/tCO2) (MWh) (MWh) (MWh)
5 6,227 2,582 3,645
6 5,625 575 5,049
7 5,022 -1,431 6,453
8 4,420 -3,437 7,857
9 3,818 -5,444 9,262
10 3,215 -7,450 10,666
11 2,613 -9,457 12,070
12 2,011 -11,463 13,474
13 1,409 -13,470 14,878
14 806 -15,476 16,282
15 204 -17,483 17,686
16 -398 -19,489 19,091
Table B6: Marginal effects of trade flows for different carbon prices, UK
Carbon price Import Export Net imports
(e/tCO2) (MWh) (MWh) (MWh)
5 -0.4312 0.1793 -0.6117
7 -0.3695 0.1590 -0.5286
9 -0.3079 0.1387 -0.4454
11 -0.2462 0.1184 -0.3623
13 -0.1846 0.0981 -0.2792
15 -0.1229 0.0778 -0.1961
17 -0.0613 0.0575 -0.1130
19 0.0004 0.0372 -0.0299
21 0.0621 0.0169 0.0532
23 0.1237 -0.0034 0.1364
25 0.1854 -0.0237 0.2195
27 0.2470 -0.0441 0.3026
29 0.3087 -0.0644 0.3857
31 0.3703 -0.0847 0.4688
33 0.4320 -0.1050 0.5519
35 0.4936 -0.1253 0.6350
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C Effectiveness of wind and solar for different load profiles
The abatement effectiveness ofwind and solar generation depends also on the level of demand
as well as on the actual amount of wind and solar generation already in the market. Thus,
Figure C1 presents marginal abatement effects of wind and solar at various production levels
in Germany, for load values ranging between 1,300 GWh and 1,700 GWh (evluated at means
for other control variables). Notably, wind and solar feed in at different hours of the day so
that median electricity demand fundamentally differs (see Appendix Figure D1a). While the
median load during wind production is 64.1 GWh, median load during solar production is
significantly higher at 71.3 GWh. We can see that for low demand, wind is more effective at
higher feed-in levels. However, with increasing load, marginal abatement of the various wind
feed-in levels converges to about 400 tCO2 (per GWh of wind). In contrast, solar seems to be
highly effective only for little solar feed-in during times of low demand. With higher demand,
solar’s effectiveness diminishes significantly. An explanation is that for high levels of load,
more and more gas is in the merit order, so that the relatively limited feed-in of solar cannot
replace substantial amounts of coal-based emissions.
Figure C2 shows marginal effects of offsetting emissions for various feed-in levels of wind
in the UK, evaluated for different demand levels. Although it is difficult to find common pat-
terns for low, medium and high wind feed-in evaluated at low-to-medium electricity demand,
it seems that the effectiveness of all wind profiles tapers off at high electricity demand. The
main reason is that at high load, wind offsets rather gas than coal at the margin, leading to a
limited effectiveness.
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Figure C1: Marginal abatement of wind & solar for different levels of load, DE
(a) Wind, DE
(b) Solar, DE
The Figures show marginal abatement effects of wind and solar evaluated at
different feed-in levels and for varying demand. Other control variables are
evaluated at their means.
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Figure C2: Marginal effects of wind on abatement, UK
The Figure shows marginal abatement effects of wind evaluated at different feed-
in levels (for means of the other variables).
D Patterns of wind, solar, and demand
Figures D1a and D1b depict the averages of demand as well as wind and solar (only for Ger-
many) feed-in by hour of the day. For both countries we observe typical electricity demand
patterns, with two peaks around noon and in the evening hours, whereas the absolute peak
for Germany is during noon and for the UK at around 7 pm. In Germany, solar feed-in peaks
also at noon, which correlates pretty well with demand. For both countries, we observe that
wind feed-in is, on average, rather stable during the day (despite tremendous intermittency,
which the Figures cannot depict as they provide mean values), implying that wind produces
not only during hours of high demand but also during low demand (e.g. at night).
Figure D1: Patterns of wind, solar, and demand in the course of a day
(a) DE
Sample averages over 1 January 2017 – 29 June 2018.
Source: own data
(b) UK
Sample averages over 27 May 2011 – 15 July 2018.
Source: own data
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